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ABSTRACT
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were approved with
the most earnest of good intentions at the First United Nations Crime Congress in 1955,
in an attempt to establish “what is generally accepted as being good principle and practice
in the treatment of prisoners and the management of institutions.” In spite of their noble
purpose, implementation of these rules has been somewhat of a disappointment. Europe
has adopted the Standard Minimum Rules wholesale. The United States, by contrast, has
declined to adopt a set of standards patterned after the Standard Minimum Rules, relying
instead on pre-existing correctional standards bolstered by reforms resulting from
prisoner civil rights litigation. This paper will review the status of the Standard Minimum
Rules and, using Europe and the United States as examples, will demonstrate how these
guidelines can be an important, and not an impotent, tool when implemented in
connection with a domestic enforcement mechanism.
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INTRODUCTION
Scandals involving mistreatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and
at the Guantanamo Bay detention center have raised questions about what legal
protections apply to the persons imprisoned in these facilities. There has been much
debate about the extent to which international law protects individuals seized during the
“war on terror,” particularly about application of the laws protecting prisoners of war
found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.3 While this discussion has frequently focused on
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See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (12
Aug. 1949) (“Geneva Convention I”); Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (12 Aug. 1949)
(“Geneva Convention II”); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (“Geneva Convention III”) 75 U.N.T.S. 135, T.I.A.S. 3364, 6 U.S.T. 3316

whether terror suspects qualify for protection under the laws of war as “lawful” or
“unlawful” combatants,4 it has also highlighted protections intended to apply to all
detainees, such as those found in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (the “Standard Minimum Rules”),5 which were approved with
high hopes in 1955.
In spite of the longstanding existence of the Standard Minimum Rules,
enforcement of prisoners rights on an international level has proven frustrating. Apart
from the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of prisoners of war and other
multinational agreements such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,6 or the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

(12 Aug. 1949); and Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (12 Aug. 1949)
(“Geneva Convention IV”).
4

See generally George C. Harris, Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept of the
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(2004); Pierre-Richard Prosper, United States Policy and Practice for the
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(2005); Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill and Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons
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Terrorism Posted Extraordinary Challenges for Military Attorneys and
Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 681 (2005).
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Treatment or Punishment,7 there is no international treaty devoted solely to the rights of
detainees.

Unlike these conventional sources,8 the model guidelines found in the

Standard Minimum Rules are considered a “soft” source of international law.9

Soft

sources of law assist in identifying trends or matters of concern within the international
community, but they do not impose legally binding obligations on their own.10 Of
course, these soft sources can be an important component of customary international law,
which depends on objective patterns of state practice and subjective patterns of
expectation in order to establish that a given norm may be considered universally binding
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United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-200,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1988).

8

There are many sources of international law, but some sources have a higher
priority. See Statute of the Court of International Justice, Art. 38(1), T.S. No.
993, 59 Stat. 1055 (June 26, 1945) (identifying international conventions,
international custom, “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,”
as well as ‘judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations” as among the sources). A “hard” source such as
a multilateral convention or treaty generally becomes binding on a party once the
instrument is signed and ratified in accordance with domestic laws. See MARK W.
JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-40 (4th ed. 2003). In
contrast to a legally binding treaty among nations, resolutions of international
organizations — such as the United Nations — are sometimes regarded as “soft
law.” Id. at 52-53. Thus, there is a distinction between sources of international
law and so-called “soft” sources that, while not strictly binding, are not
completely void of legal significance. Id. United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-200, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1988).
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See RICHARD B. LILLICH AND HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 276-339 (3rd ed. 1995) (discussing the
creation of new human rights norms created by the United Nations other than by
treaty, using the Standard Minimum Rules as an example of the “model law” or
“soft law” approach).
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See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-61 (2001) (describing sources
of “soft” international law).

without the need for a treaty or convention.11 A given source’s vitality, its status, and its
utility are objective factors in this analysis.
The Standard Minimum Rules were intended to serve as important source of
guidelines for good prison administration. Unlike the Geneva Conventions, however,
which have been widely accepted, the implementation process for the Standard Minimum
Rules has been fairly flaccid, undercutting its potency as a source of protection for
prisoners.12 This has not been for lack of well meaning efforts, however ineffective,
undertaken by the United Nations and advocates of the Standard Minimum Rules.
Thirty years ago, proponents of the Standard Minimum Rules encouraged
wholesale adoption by means of direct incorporation into domestic legal systems as
opposed to indirect piece-meal implementation through judicial interpretation.13 Europe

11

See JANIS, supra note 8 at 41-48.
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Domestic implementation of international legal norms such as those found in the
Geneva Conventions or the Standard Minimum Rules generally occurs through
the process of incorporation. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (2nd ed. 2003). Sometimes incorporation occurs
directly, such as where a state incorporates an international law through a
legislative act. See id. Sometimes incorporation occurs indirectly, such as where
an international norm is used as an interpretive aid to clarify or supplement
domestic law. See id. A third type of incorporation occurs by reference, such as
when a domestic statute refers to a particular source of international law. See id.
at 13-14 (pointing to federal statutes outlawing “piracy as defined by the law of
nations” or violations of the “law of war”).
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Douglas J. Besharov and Gerhard Mueller, The Demands of the Inmates of Attica
State Prison and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners: A Comparison, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 839, 853 (1972) (advocating
general acceptance through wholesale adoption of the Standard Minimum Rules
into domestic law as “preferable to the route of unpredictable and expensive court
litigation, point by point, standard by standard”).

has followed this direct strategy,14 adopting the Standard Minimum Rules outright and
updating them with their own set of regional guidelines known as the European Prison
Rules.15 The United States, by contrast, has not formally adopted the Standard Minimum
Rules, but has relied instead on standards developed by different professional
organizations and on enforcement of prisoners rights through litigation that sometimes
takes the Standard Minimum Rules into consideration. Thus, it can be said that the
United States has taken an indirect approach to incorporating the Standard Minimum
Rules.16
Regardless of the means of incorporation, the Standard Minimum Rules, by
themselves, have not achieved the level of respect accorded to formal treaties. This paper
will review the status of the Standard Minimum Rules within Europe and the United
States to examine their effectiveness — or lack thereof — in each system. To provide
some context for the development of the Standard Minimum Rules, part one of this paper
will briefly review prison reform movements in Europe and the United States. Part two

14

See PAUST, supra note 12, at 12 (“Direct incorporation of international law
involves use of an international agreement or customary international law directly
as law forming the basis for a claim, right, duty, power, civil cause of action,
criminal prosecution, or other type of sanction.”).
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See Council of Europe, European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners, Resolution No. 73(5) (Jan. 19, 1973); Council of Europe, European
Prison Rules, Recommendation No. R(87)3 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States (Strasbourg, Feb. 12, 1987).
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See PAUST, supra note 12, at 12 (“In this instance, international law is not used
directly as the basis for a civil claim or criminal prosecution, but indirectly to
inform the meaning of some other law or legal instrument.”); see also, e.g., Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (examining the content of international norms
to inform the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and whether the execution of juveniles qualified as “cruel and unusual
punishment” under evolving standards of decency).

of the paper will examine the history of the Standard Minimum Rules as an important
human rights instrument and will comment separately on how the implementation
process has sputtered at an international level. This section of the paper will also offer
some generalizations about which provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules have
become settled international norms. Part three of the paper will address how prisoners’
rights are protected in Europe and the United States by prison standards that have been
influenced by the Standard Minimum Rules in different ways as well as by the
availability of judicial review for abusive practices and conditions. This part of the paper
will also make a few observations about why the Standard Minimum Rules have
influenced these systems differently and how this has affected their utility. This review
will show that, while the Standard Minimum Rules serve an important function of
articulating generally accepted levels of prison administration, these guidelines, standing
alone, are ineffectual without an enforcement mechanism to vindicate the rights of
prisoners who have suffered true mistreatment.
I.

HISTORY OF PRISON REFORM
A brief overview of historical prison reform movements will assist with a

comparison of legal systems in Europe and the United States and the evolution of prison
standards.17 This historical review will demonstrate why guidelines such as the Standard
Minimum Rules were necessary to address important issues that affect all persons in
detention and will show that good intentions toward prisoner welfare have been around
17

LIORA LAZARUS, CONTRASTING PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE
EXAMINATION OF GERMANY AND ENGLAND 5 (2004) (observing that a historical
review is frequently relevant to a comparative law analysis because “‘it is not
sufficient just to look at legal texts and rules to explain why legal systems are
different.’”) (quoting J. Bell, Comparing Public Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN
ST
THE 21 CENTURY 11 (2002) (A. Harding and E. Örücü, eds.)).

just as long as there have been prisons. This review reveals that, historically, good
intentions have frequently been thwarted by the complexities of prison administration. It
will also help clarify why the legal systems in Europe and the United States have taken
different approaches with respect to the Standard Minimum Rules. Before discussing
prison reform efforts, it is helpful to consider why imprisonment developed as a popular
form of punishment in the first place.
A.

Prison as Punishment

Imprisonment has not always been the predominant form of punishment for
criminal offenses as it is today. Historically, the most common forms of punishment for
serious misdeeds were banishment or exile, enslavement, corporal punishment, capital
punishment, and, for lesser offenses, public humiliation or shame-based measures, such
as placement in stocks.18 During early times, punishment-as-public-spectacle was used
as a method to control crime.19 Although prisons, jails, and dungeons existed, they were
used primarily to hold debtors or to detain those accused of an offense and were not the
primary means for punishing offenders.20 Conditions in European jails during this time

18

See IRA J. SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 70-71 (2nd ed.
2001).
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TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 24 (6th ed. 2003);
Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: Ancient and Medieval Worlds, in
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 3, 32 (Norval Morris and David J. Rothman,
eds., 1998) (“Punishment in English criminal law was intended to be quick and
public to serve as a deterrent to other crime. Thus, forms of punishment ranged
from shaming display – the pillory, mutilation, branding, public stocks, and
ducking stools – to severe and aggravated capital punishments – hanging,
drowning, burning, burial alive, or decapitation – and any of these could be
preceded by the infliction of torments before the execution itself.”).

20

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 79; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 27; Randall M. McGowen, The Well-Ordered

were extremely poor: “Men, women, and children, healthy and sick, were locked up
together; the strong preyed on the weak, sanitation was nonexistent, and disease was
epidemic.”21 Still, incarceration was not typically imposed as punishment.
An early effort to use imprisonment for the purpose of correction or reformation
stemmed from the so-called Protestant work ethic. A forerunner of the modern prison,
the workhouse evolved after the Protestant Reformation in the Sixteenth Century as a
way to reform those who were “living in sin” or to put beggars and vagabonds to useful
purpose.22 The prison workhouse regime “revolved around forced labor,” except on
Sunday, which was reserved for religious instruction.23

The workhouse eventually

became known as the “house of correction,” where the “inmates – primarily prostitutes,
beggars, minor criminals, and the idle poor such as the orphaned and the sick – were to
be disciplined and set to work.”24
Advances in social thinking contributed to the abandonment of humiliating public
spectacles and other cruel practices of punishment. The Enlightenment, which occurred
Prison, in OXFORD HISTORY
Rothman, eds., 1998).

OF THE

PRISON 72 (Norval Morris and David J.
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CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 27.
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SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 79.

23

See Pieter Spierenburg, The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe, in
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 64.

24

CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 28; see also STEPHEN
LIVINGSTONE, TIM OWEN, AND ALISON MCDONALD, PRISON LAW § 1.02 (3rd ed.
2003) (describing the “local prison,” which included facilities called “bridewells”
and “houses of correction (which existed to encourage vagabonds, beggars, and
the ‘idle poor’ in the ways of work but which also housed minor offenders)” in
contrast to the “local gaol,” which housed felons, misdemeanants, convicted or
unconvicted, civil debtors, and, until 1867, those awaiting transportation to an
Australian penal colony).

in the 1700s, ushered in an era of reform that saw important changes in Western society’s
thinking about religion, government, and science, as well as criminal laws and
correctional practices.25

During this time, there was a shift away from corporal

punishment and, in its place, the “penitentiary developed as an institution in which
criminals could be isolated from the temptations of society, reflect on their offenses, and
thus be reformed.”26
The first prison in the United States, the Walnut Street Jail in Philadelphia, was
built in 1787, and expanded in 1790 to include a “Penitentiary House.”27 It featured a
program advocated by the Quakers, who wanted to reform offenders while providing
humane treatment.28

The Quakers opposed corporal punishment and believed that

reformation was the only real purpose of punishment.29 They favored order and quiet in
the prison environment to allow for true penitence.30 Under the Quaker regime, serious
offenders were placed into solitary confinement until they could earn the privilege of

25

See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 32.

26

Id.

27

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 86-87; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 42.

28

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 86; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 42 (Legislation passed in
Pennsylvania in 1790, which was heavily influenced by the Quakers,
contemplated the establishment of “an institution in which ‘solitary confinement
to hard labor and a total abstinence from spiritous liquors will prove the most
effectual means of reforming these unhappy creatures.’”) (quoting BLAKE
MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 8 (1977)).

29

See McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 86.

30

See id.

engaging in work, which was enjoyed by less serious offenders who were housed
communally.31
Crowded conditions at the Walnut Street Jail facility led to the construction of the
first free-standing penitentiary. To combat overcrowding, which was seen as detrimental
to reform, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized construction of the Eastern
Penitentiary in Cherry Hill, just outside of Philadelphia.32

Under the Pennsylvania

system, inmates lived separately in a facility designed so that they “ate, slept, read their
Bibles, received moral instruction, and worked in their cells” with limited interaction
with each other, prison employees, or members of the public.33 They were allowed one
hour of exercise per day.34 This program featured Quaker ideals of solitary confinement,
work, and penitence.35
The penitentiary movement in the United States actually stemmed from increased
interest in prison conditions in Europe, which were deplorable, and modern thinking
about crime and punishment.36 England, which could no longer export convicts to the
31

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 86; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 43.

32

SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 87; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 39 (“Few Americans realize that their
country gave the world its first penitentiary, an institution created to reform
offenders within an environment designed to focus their full attention on their
moral rehabilitation.”).

33

SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 87.

34

See id.

35

See id. at 88.

36

See REPORTS OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY OF BOSTON, vol. 1, at x (1972).
The Quakers of Philadelphia were greatly influenced by Italy’s Cesare Beccaria
and his Essay on Crimes and Punishment, which was published in 1764. See id.

American Colonies after the War of Independence in 1776, began to use old decommissioned ships or “hulks” to house convicts.37 A year later in 1777, prison reformer
John Howard penned a scathing report that condemned prison conditions throughout
Europe.38 In his book, The State of the Prisons, Howard reported that conditions in
English and European jails in general were filthy, prisoners were often ill, as well as ill
treated, and the system was corrupt.39 Howard’s book, which envisioned a healthy and
efficient prison as an ideal, proved influential to the Quakers in America.40
In spite of Howard’s revelations, Europe did not immediately embrace the
penitentiary idea. England adopted a proposal of penal reform based on the penitentiary
principle but ultimately decided that it would be cheaper to transport convicts to a penal
colony in Australia.41 During this time, England had operated a dual system of local jails
or “gaols” as well as a small number of “convict prisons.”42 At some point, American
37

LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 1.03.

38

See John Howard, The State of the Prisons, excerpts of which are reprinted in
IMPRISONMENT: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES at 7-29 (John Muncie and Richard
Sparks, eds., 1991). In addition to prisons in the “United Provinces” of England,
Scotland, and Ireland, Howard visited prisons in France, Flanders, Holland,
Germany, Prussia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Poland. See also
McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 78-80 (discussing John
Howard’s quest for healthy and efficient penal institutions and his influence as a
prison reformer in Great Britain).

39

See gen. Howard, supra note 38, at 7-29.

40

See McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 79, 86-88. See also
REPORTS OF THE PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY OF BOSTON, supra note 36, vol. 1, at
viii - xiv (discussing early corrections in America and the Pennsylvania system).

41

See John Hirst, The Australian Experience: The Convict Colony, in OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 236 (referencing the Penitentiary Act of 1779, which
was influenced by John Howard’s 1777 treatise State of the Prisons).

42

See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 1.02.

experiments with the penitentiary began to influence reform efforts abroad.43 After it
ceased transporting convicts to Australia and other outposts in 1857, England
implemented a program of penal servitude in its place and enacted reforms in an effort to
improve prison conditions in response to those described in John Howard’s book.44
France would continue deporting recidivist convicts to penal colonies such as those found
in French Guyana and New Caledonia until 1897.45 Eventually, other European countries
would adopt the Pennsylvania model for their own penal systems.46
Even as the Pennsylvania model grew in popularity in Europe, this system was
soon abandoned in the United States for another that was developed in 1816 at the
Auburn Prison in New York.

Although the “New York” or “Auburn” plan had

similarities to the Pennsylvania scheme, there were important differences in correctional
philosophy and economy.

The Auburn plan established a “congregate system” of

confinement that, like the Pennsylvania model, emphasized discipline, obedience, and
work.47

The Auburn system viewed prolonged isolation of the type found in the

43

See McGowen, The Well-Ordered Prison, supra note 20, at 88. In comparison to
the gallows, the use of imprisonment for punishment was viewed as reform. See
id.

44

See id. at §§ 1.04, 1.05.

45

See Patricia O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent: Europe, 1865-1965, in
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON at 190-91.

46

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 88; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 44 (“Most European visitors favored
the Pennsylvania model, and the First International Prison Congress, held in 1846
in Germany, endorsed it by a large majority. The separate system was soon
incorporated in correctional facilities in Germany, France, Belgium, and
Holland.”).

47

CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 44; see also David J.
Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in OXFORD HISTORY

Pennsylvania model cruel, however, and featured instead segregated confinement of each
inmate at night only, work by prisoners during the day to pay the cost of imprisonment,
and a rigidly enforced rule of silence to prevent inmates from “corrupting each other or
plotting escapes and riots.”48 The Auburn system, which generally continued to regard
reformation as the goal of penitentiary-style punishment, quickly became the model for
prisons in the United States because it was less expensive to operate than the
Pennsylvania model.49 At least twenty-nine states built Auburn-style prisons.50
B.

The Reformatory Movement and the 1870 Declaration of Principles

Prison overcrowding and budget problems essentially doomed whatever noble
intentions were found in the Pennsylvania and Auburn models of penitentiary
management. In that respect, overcrowding and understaffing made it impossible to

PRISON at 105 (describing the congregate system of imprisonment
implemented at the Auburn State Prison and then at Ossining, better known as
Sing Sing, as opposed to the separate system found in Pennsylvania).
OF THE

48

SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 89; see also Rothman, Perfecting
the Prison, supra note 47, at 106 (noting that, unlike the Pennsylvania system,
which confined prisoners to individual cells for their entire sentence of
confinement, prisoners in an Auburn prison slept alone, one to a cell, but
congregated during to work in prison shops where they were not allowed to speak
to one another).

49

SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 90.

50

See id. at 92; see also Rothman, Perfecting the Prison, supra note 47, at 107
(observing that almost all the states adopted the Auburn plan out of an
“eager[ness] to realize the rehabilitative influence of the prison without incurring
the greater costs required by the Pennsylvania system”). For example, the “Walls
Unit” in Huntsville, originally constructed as the first Texas prison in 1848, is an
Auburn model prison. See CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note
19, at 46.

enforce the disciplined structure of either system.51 In place of these regimented systems
appeared brutal regimes that featured leased inmate labor and harsh punishment that often
amounted to torture.52

Overcrowding became the rule, as did increasing prisoner

unrest.53 Further contributing to the demise of early reformation efforts was the changing
nature of the United States prison population, which included a rising percentage of
immigrants. Beginning in the 1860s, the type of inmate arriving at state penitentiaries
also represented a “more hardened group” of murderers, robbers, and rapists.54
The failure of the Pennsylvania and Auburn-plan prisons did not signal an end to
Quaker-like concern for prisoner welfare in the United States. Rather, it triggered an
interest in implementing ideas for reform from abroad. In 1870, penal reformers from the
United States, Canada, South America, and Europe attended the first National Congress
on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati, Ohio.55 The 1870 Congress
resulted in the formation of an organization of correctional professionals, the National

51

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 92; see also Rothman,
Perfecting the Prison, supra note 47, at 109 (observing that prison officials were
able to maintain the rule of silence prior to 1850 because overcrowding was not a
problem before that time).

52

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 92; see also CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 45 (observing that, by 1840, “hard
labor organized under the contract system achieved dominance in northeastern
penitentiaries”).

53

See Rothman, Perfecting the Prison, supra note 47, at 112 (noting that, by 1866,
even the Pennsylvania penitentiary at Philadelphia, which had once housed all
inmates in solitary confinement, could no longer completely separate all of its
inmates).

54

See id. at 113.

55

ANTHONY P. TRAVISONO AND MARY Q. HAWKES, BUILDING A VOICE: 125 YEARS
OF HISTORY [THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION] 5(1995).

Prison Association, which would later become known as the American Correctional
Association (the “ACA”).56 As a result of this Congress, penal reformers in the United
States embraced a new philosophy developed in Ireland, which featured a “mark” system
of stages to punish offenders for their past crimes and to prepare offenders to return to
society.57 Significantly, the Congress also resulted in a “Declaration of Principles of
Prison Discipline” (the “1870 Declaration of Principles”), consisting of thirty-seven
articles,58 which generally advocated “a philosophy of reformation as opposed to the
adoption of punishment, progressive classification of prisoners based on the mark system,
the indeterminate sentence, and the cultivation of the inmate’s self-respect.”59
The 1870 Declaration of Principles have proven to be an influential and enduring
model for prison reform.60 Based on principles from this model, which emphasized

56

See id. at 6. In 1941, the National Prison Association was renamed the American
Prison Association, which became the American Correctional Association in
1954. See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 98, n.8.
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SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 92-95; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 48 (describing the “Irish or intermediate system”
in which an inmate could earn “marks” to transfer through stages of solitary
confinement to a modern precursor of the parole system) (emphasis in original).
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See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 205-19 (setting out the Principles
in full).
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SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 95 (quoting from the Declaration of
Principles adopted by the newly-organized National Prison Association following
a conference of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory
Discipline in Cincinnati); see also CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS,
supra note 19, at 49 (describing the “Cincinnati Declaration” of 1870).
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See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 59, 121-22 (observing that the
Declaration of Principles adopted in 1870 as been revised and reaffirmed by the
ACA in 1930, in 1960, and again in 1970, with the basic structure still intact).

rehabilitation, the first “reformatory” opened in Elmira, New York, in 1876.61 Between
1877 and 1913, seventeen states built reformatories,62 which were designed to emphasize
rehabilitative programs that featured educational and vocational training.63 Although the
rehabilitative model resulted in a number of innovative programs, including the first
parole system in the United States, the liberal ideals of reform were frustrated as the
system eventually regressed to the harsh disciplinary methods of previous years.64
C.

Failure of Reform and the Crime Control Era

Like the penitentiary system devised by the early Quakers, rehabilitative
principles advanced by the reformatory movement had noble intentions. Unfortunately,
overcrowded and chaotic conditions of the type that led to the demise of the Pennsylvania
and Auburn models also contributed to the failure of the reformatory movement.65 By
the outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914, the reformatory movement was in full
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See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 95; see also Edgardo Rotman,
The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
PRISON at 154-55 (reporting that the Elmira Reformatory in New York, which
opened in 1876, featured a system based on ideas advanced at the 1870 National
Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati).
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See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 96.
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See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 155-56 (discussing the Elmira
model).
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See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 96-97 (citing one report, which
stated that reformatory inmates rejected the authority of their custodians resorted
to “violence, revolts, escapes, drugs, arson, homosexuality [and] suicide,”
resulting in a system that was “ineffective and brutal” rather than “benevolent”);
CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 50 (outlining an 1893
investigation into charges of brutality at the Elmira reformatory, “which revealed
that the whip and solitary confinement were used there regularly”).
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See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 156.

decline.66 Conditions in the United States prison system also continued to deteriorate as
corrupt, understaffed institutions struggled to maintain control of overcrowded facilities,
often resorting to brutal, arbitrary forms of punishment, such as “lashing.”67
The failure of the reformatory movement left a void that would be filled with
institutions whose main purpose was to warehouse offenders.

The United States

government opened its first federal prison in 1895, in Leavenworth, Kansas, for civilians
convicted of violating federal law.68 The years between 1900 and 1950 saw an increase
in this type of “Big House” prison, which resembled a military-style fortress, and the
emergence of the United States Bureau of Prisons as federal prisoners grew in number.69
With the rise of the Big House also came the proliferation of leased prison labor
at state-run facilities, by which private entrepreneurs were allowed to exploit and profit
from a cheap workforce that was organized into chain gangs.70 Prison farms, which also
relied heavily on inmate labor, operated throughout the American south by 1917.71 These
66
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See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 156.
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FRANK SCHMALLEGER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TODAY 562 (8th ed. 2005); see also
Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 166 (The first site chosen for the
construction of a federal prison was Leavenworth, [Kansas].”) and 212 (“The
Three Prisons Act of 1890 authorized building federal prisons at Leavenworth
Kansas; Atlanta, Georgia; and McNeil Island, Washington. Until 1890, those
convicted of federal offenses were farmed out by contract to state institutions.”).
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See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 116, 118-26; see also Rotman,
Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 165 (commenting on the new “Big House”
type of prison managed by professionals instead of short-term political appointees
and designed to hold large populations of inmates, who were controlled with
“stultifying routines, monotonous schedules, and isolation”).
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See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 157.
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farms depended upon forced labor to grow their own food and harvest other crops,
including cotton, in plantation-style fashion.72 In Mississippi, practically all inmates were
forced to perform agricultural work at the infamous Parchman farm, which relied on
surveillance performed by other prisoners — or trustees — who were notoriously cruel.73
The self-sufficient “prison farm complex” flourished during the Great Depression of the
1930s when states lacked funds for prison programs or improvements.74 Eventually, civil
rights activists would target racist prison policies practiced at the prison farms,
particularly in Mississippi.75
The failure of the reformatory movement along with the rise of Big House
penitentiaries and prison farms did not mean that there was a total loss of interest in
prisoner rehabilitation in the United States. In the 1930s, the growing influence of
behavioral sciences in the fields of social work, psychiatry, and psychology led to a
progressive reform movement in United States prisons.76

Under this “medical or

therapeutic model,” the assumption was that “criminal offenders suffered from some
form of physical, mental, or social pathology.”77
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See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 157.
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See Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 158-59 (outlining the
psychotherapeutic model of prison reform underway in the United States at the
turn of the 20th Century).

Rapid social and political change in Europe also signaled changes in the treatment
of prisoners. European countries experienced fluctuations in the development and use of
imprisonment as a model of punishment, as different nations maintained their own
distinct prison systems.78 Some nations reacted to criticisms lodged against the use of
imprisonment toward the end of the nineteenth century by experimenting with noncustodial forms of punishment.79 Other nations expanded their prison systems.80 The
gulag-style prisons in the former Soviet Union that featured forced prison labor,81 and the
concentration camps utilized by Germany and Italy during World War II,82 are
considered the most extreme examples of imprisonment in Europe during this period.83
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See Patricia O’Brien, The Prison on the Continent: Europe, 1865-1965, supra
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as “nonincarcerative punishments”); see also Norman Bishop, Aspects of
European Penal Systems, in PROGRESS IN PENAL REFORM at 84-90 (Louis BlomCooper, ed., 1974) (describing restrictions on, and alternative penalties to,
imprisonment; these included suspended sentences, conditional sentences of
probation, the imposition of special duties, community service, and administrative
fines).
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see also FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, HOUSE OF THE DEAD (David McDuff, trans. 1985)
(1860) (depicting an account based on the author’s four years in a Siberian
convict prison).
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Treatment of prisoners or, more accurately, the mistreatment of prisoners in
Europe during World War I and World War II, elevated the notion of prison reform to a
critical human rights issue. Social change that followed after the end of World War II
further renewed interest in rehabilitative institutions of the sort envisioned by United
States penal reformers in 1870.84 In 1946, the American Correctional Association would
publish the Manual of Suggested Standards for a State Correctional System.85 At the
international level, these concerns also resulted in the codification of humanitarian
principles found in the laws of war with the adoption of four Geneva Conventions in
1949.86
At the same time, the early 1950s were marred by a rise in prison violence, riots,
and less serious rebellions such as sit down strikes, acts of escape, and self-mutilation by
prisoners attempting to avoid harsh work requirements.87 The complaints that sparked
these uprisings often concerned deficient prison facilities, “lack of hygiene and medical
care, poor food quality, lack of treatment, and guard brutality.”88

These rebellions

demonstrated that reforms promoted during the progressive era were largely rhetorical,
frustrating the expectations of prisoners who fought — literally — for improved
84

See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 126.

85

See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 98 (detailing the evolution of
correctional standards from the early 1946 edition to the present).
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unprecedented number of riots in American prisons occurring between 1951 and
1953, as well as hunger strikes, and incidents in which prisoners slashed their own
heel tendons in protest of brutal treatment).
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Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 168.

conditions of confinement.89 Europe experienced a similar wave of prison riots and
revolts that were also accompanied by demands from inmates for improved conditions to
lessen the “pains of imprisonment.”90
Prisoner unrest led to a renewed emphasis on rehabilitative treatment in the
United States. In 1954, the American Correctional Association issued a revised Manual
of Correctional Standards.91 Consistent with the 1870 Declaration of Principles, the ACA
continued to emphasize rehabilitation as the basic aim of prison institutions.92 The
rehabilitative philosophy featured indeterminate sentences, the length of which depended
on whether an offender’s behavior indicated that he had been “cured” or reformed.93
The rehabilitative model introduced the concept of inmate classification in an attempt to
diagnose and treat criminals according to their needs.94 Likewise, treatment, therapy, and
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Id.
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Bishop, Aspects of European Penal Systems, supra note 79, at 91 (noting by way
of example a number of riots in the Swedish and English prisons, in the Toul
prison in France, and the Regina Coeli prison in Rome); see also Adams, PRISON
RIOTS IN BRITAIN AND THE USA, supra note 87, at 117-29 (discussing prison riots
in Britain in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, over prison conditions).
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published in 1946 as the MANUAL OF SUGGESTED STANDARDS FOR A STATE
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM. It was revised again in 1959 and in 1966. See id. at 99.
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See SILVERMAN, CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 128.

93

See id. at 128-29.
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See id. at 129. The “medical model” of corrections emphasized rehabilitation of
offenders, which in turn increased the importance of inmate classification as the
first step in prescribing any needed treatment regimen. See CLEAR & COLE,
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 53-54; see also Rotman, Failure of
Reform, supra note 61, at 159 (“[T]he new emphasis on diagnosis made
classification a critical concern for the Progressive penal system.”).

counseling programs began to find a place in prisons.95 It was during this time that the
United Nations Economic and Social Council would approve the Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,96 which are discussed in more detail below.
Notwithstanding the interest in rehabilitative treatment, another wave of prison
violence erupted in the United States and in Europe in the early 1970s. The infamous
1971 riot at the Attica State Prison in New York, which resulted in thirty-two inmate
deaths,97 coincided with disturbances in British prisons.98 Prisoners in France also rioted
in early 1972, demanding better living conditions.99 After the Attica prison rebellion,
violence began to escalate in prisons everywhere.100 Reformers began to advocate a
model of corrections based on community reintegration, favoring shorter terms in prison
or avoiding prison altogether in favor of probation.101
At the same time that the humane treatment of prisoners became viewed as a
human rights issue, control of crime increasingly was recognized as an important social
issue. Political climates changed in the late 1970s and 1980s, when advocates of crime
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control called for an end to the rehabilitative era in imprisonment.102 Citing its lack of
effect on rates of recidivism, the crime control model ushered in a host of measures
designed to get tough on crime, such as the increased use of determinate sentences
designed to incarcerate offenders for longer periods.103 In the United States federal
system, parole was abolished.104

The increased emphasis on imprisonment as

punishment caused an explosion of incarceration rates in the United States, which
remains under the crime-control model today.105 As crime rates have also increased in
Europe, so too have prison populations there, although few European countries apart
from the United Kingdom have emulated United States crime-control policies.106
A modern extension of the crime-control movement has been the development of
international tribunals and the corresponding need to punish violators of international
criminal law, including those who have committed war crimes and other atrocities. The
need for an international prison is one of recent vintage.

There are two detention

facilities presently operating in connection with proceedings pending before international
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1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027. Chapter II of this
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1, 1987. See Sentencing Reform Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. 99-217, § 4, 99
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criminal tribunals for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.107
Prisoners sentenced by these tribunals are transferred to countries that agree to take them
and so they are eventually incarcerated in national prisons.108 These national prison
facilities, nevertheless, are bound to comply with international standards for the detention
of these prisoners.109
II.

HISTORY OF THE STANDARD MINIMUM RULES
As indicated in the preceding historical overview of prison reform, the Standard

Minimum Rules are linked to an era of increased concern for human rights and a time of
growing interest in the promise of rehabilitation. The Geneva Conventions of 1949,
which codified the laws of war in light of the strife occasioned by international conflict,
included specific protections for prisoners of war.110 Outside the prisoner-of-war context,
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See Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 357,
357-58 (2005) (referencing war crime tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda and detention facilities located in Scheveningen near the Hague and in
Arusha, Tanzania).
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See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 3 (Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War). Article 3, which is common to all four of the Geneva
Conventions, hence its designation as “Common Article 3,” provides that
“[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely” and prohibits “cruel treatment and torture” as well as
“[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment[.]” Article 27 requires that all prisoners of war must be treated with
“respect for their persons” and “their honour,” and further that “[t]hey shall at all
times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity[.]” Article 32
prohibits “any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering . . .
of protected persons,” which extends “not only to murder, torture, corporal
punishment, [and] mutilation . . . , but also to any other measures of brutality
whether applied by civilian or military agents.” According to Article 147, “torture
or inhuman treatment,” and acts “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury

however, international interest in the treatment of offenders became linked to efforts
associated with the administration of justice and the prevention of crime as a social issue.
As the following discussion shows, the drafting and approval of the Standard Minimum
Rules represents an equally earnest attempt to address human rights goals while in pursuit
of a social agenda to eradicate crime at an international level.
A.

Drafting and Approval of the Standard Minimum Rules

As noted above, there was an early effort to articulate guidelines for the treatment
of prisoners in 1870, with the Declaration of Principles outlined at the inaugural National
Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati.111 The first effort to
adopt international prison standards was made by an entity affiliated with the League of
Nations. The Standard Minimum Rules were first developed in 1926 by the International
Penitentiary Commission and revised in 1933 by the successor of that entity, the
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission or IPPC.112 The League of Nations
approved these rules in 1934 before dissolving.113 The IPPC would prepare a final draft

to body or health” are included among the type of conduct considered to be
“[g]rave breaches” of the Convention.
111

See SILVERMAN: CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at 95; CLEAR & COLE, AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS, supra note 19, at 49.
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ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROGRAM: FORMULATION OF STANDARDS AND EFFORTS AT THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION 11-12, 98 (1994). The United States participated in the first
International Prison Congress held in London in 1872, and in future international
prison congresses held by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission,
but it never became a member nation. See TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note
55, at 76.
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See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9 at 284.
See also CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 12 & n.26 (citing League of Nations Docs. C.
620.M.2411930.IV; A.44.1933.IV; A.45.1934.IV. Annex). The League of

in 1951 on behalf of the successor to the League of Nations, the United Nations, which
counted human rights as among its primary goals.114
After World War II, nations again attempted to maintain international peace and
security by joining together. The “trauma of the war” that lasted from 1939 through 1945
would usher in fundamental social changes and an “urgent interest at the international
level in human rights and the treatment of prisoners.”115 To further these goals, the
United Nations was formed in 1945.116 Article 55 of the United Nations Charter
specifically requires that all signatories “shall promote . . . universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.”117 Presumably, this mandate extends to all persons,
including those imprisoned following a criminal conviction or for any other reason.
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution
called the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).118 The UDHR primarily

Nations recommended that states adopt the Standard Minimum Rules and
proposed a regular reporting process regarding their application and on prison
reforms achieved. See id. at 12, n. 26.
114

See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 98-99.
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Kenneth Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical
Aspects, in IMPRISONMENT: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 205 (John Muncie and
Richard Sparks, eds., 1991).
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available at http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html.

AND

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

promotes the general right to human dignity and security,119 as well as several specific
rights associated with the administration of justice, including the prohibition against
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition against
arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and
the prohibition against ex post facto laws.120 These rights would be solidified in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”),121 which is another
important multinational convention adopted following World War II that is designed to
advance principles found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which also
contains specific guarantees applicable to prisoners and the administration of justice.122
To further advance the human rights and social goals outlined in the UN Charter
and the UDHR, the United Nations initiated a program aimed at crime prevention and
criminal justice administration.123 The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Program is operated by one of the principal organs of the United Nations, the
119

See id. at Article 3, 12, 17, 28.
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See id. Articles 5, 9, 10, and 11.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force March 23, 1976, entered into force for the United States June 8,
1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). See S. Rep. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 (setting out the Senate’s advice and consent to
ratification).
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ICCPR, Art. 6 (restricting the use of capital punishment); Art. 7 (prohibiting
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment); Art. 8
(prohibiting arbitrary arrest or detention); Art. 10 (requiring humane treatment
and “respect for the inherent dignity” of the human person and a penitentiary
system whose essential aim shall be reformation and social rehabilitation); Art. 14
(guaranteeing the presumption of innocence and minimum levels of due-processtype trial rights).
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CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 10.

Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC,124 with the recognition that crime is regarded
as a core social issue.125 At its formation, the United Nations articulated two kinds of
obligations on states in the area of crime and criminal justice: (1) safeguarding “the right
of the people of the world to enjoy domestic tranquillity and security of person and
property without the encroachment of criminal activity[;]” and (2) operating “efficient
criminal justice systems that do not deprive citizens of their rights.”126
One of the first steps taken to foster the program’s goal of encouraging humane
criminal justice systems was the adoption of the Standard Minimum Rules at the First
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in
1955.127 The Standard Minimum Rules were approved by the United Nations Economic
and Social Council in 1957.128 The approval language demonstrates that the Standard
Minimum Rules were not intended to be legally binding,129 and the express terms of the
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The First Congress adopted a revision of the draft prepared by the IPPC before its
dissolution in 1951. See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 99. The IPPC had been holding
regular congresses in the correctional field since 1885. See id. at 19.
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See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 134 (setting out the United Nations Economic and
Social Council resolution approving the Standard Minimum Rules and
“recommend[ing]” that “favourable consideration be given to their adoption and
application in the administration of penal and correctional institutions”) (quoting
E.S.C. Res. 663 C (XXIV), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess. Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc.
E/3048 (1957)). There have been suggestions of elevating the Standard Minimum

Rules seek only to establish “what is generally accepted as being good principle and
practice in the treatment of prisoners and the management of institutions.”130 The overall
purpose of the Standard Minimum Rules was to “inject the humanitarian spirit of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the correctional system without
compromising public safety or prison security.”131 To accomplish this humanitarian goal,
the Standard Minimum Rules emphasize humane treatment and rehabilitation, stating that
the only justification for imprisonment is “to ensure, so far as possible, that upon his
return to society, the offender is not only willing but able to lead a law-abiding and selfsupporting life.”132
The Standard Minimum Rules contain numerous substantive provisions regarding
prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners that reflect the concerns of penal
reformers such as the ones outlined above in the historical overview in part one of this
paper.133 In all, the Standard Minimum Rules consist of ninety-five provisions.134 A

Rules to a legally-binding convention, but the idea has failed to catch on. See
CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
supra note 112, at 134-35.
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Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 5, Rule 1.
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Besharov and Mueller, Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the
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Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
Working Paper, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/CG2/WP.3 at 8 (1968)).
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Rotman, Failure of Reform, supra note 61, at 169 (quoting Article 58 of the
Standard Minimum Rules).
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See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 148. Indeed, the word “Treatment” was selected for
the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners for its ambiguity to
capture the dual concern of reformers for human rights and to reflect the endeavor
to “‘cure’ the offender from re-offending.” Id.

review of the provisions shows that the range of the Standard Minimum Rules is broad,
regulating everything from the use of corporal punishment to the provision of clean
sheets. As the name implies the Standard Minimum Rules establish minimum standards
for a wide variety of functions performed by prison and jail administrators, including
prisoner registration or intake and classification, accommodations, personal hygiene,
clothing and bedding, food, exercise and sport, medical services, as well as
communication with the outside world, the availability of books, religious services and
instruction, and the use of force.135
The Standard Minimum Rules and their broad provisions were ambitious for their
time. They clearly respond to problems highlighted by the historical review of prison
reform, particularly with regard to issues affecting prisoners’ health, dignity, and prospect
for rehabilitation. Because of the noble nature of the themes found in the Standard
Minimum Rules, the United Nations Economic and Social Council encouraged states to
implement them to further the human rights and social interests of crime prevention and
fair administration of justice. In spite of their noble goals, the implementation process
has met with a surprising level of ambivalence by domestic nation states.
B.

Implementation Process
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135

See Standard Minimum Rules, supra, note 5, at ¶¶ 7-26, 37-43.

From its inception, the implementation process for the Standard Minimum Rules
has been hampered by their advisory, non-binding character, among other things. As one
commentator has observed, “implementation” has not been defined in a United Nations
instrument, but it typically consists of two elements: (1) a call for domestic incorporation
(“it connotes an effort to encourage states to apply international norms in their domestic
laws and practices”); and (2) a mechanism to enforce or to monitor compliance (“it
suggests some kind of international machinery to supervise or follow-up on the
exhortations to do so”).136 The United Nations has encouraged member states to adopt
the Standard Minimum Rules, but its mechanism for enforcing them is nonexistent and
the means of evaluating state compliance has left much to be desired.
The implementation machinery employed for the Standard Minimum Rules
initially featured data collation and dissemination of information.137 This process was
evidently selected in an effort to encourage states to make a self-assessment of their
prison systems.138 After approving the Standard Minimum Rules in 1957, the United
Nations Economic and Social Council requested progress reports on implementation and
began sending out questionnaires or surveys.139 Surveys were sent out in 1967, 1974,
1979, 1984, and 1989, so that the results would coincide with the regularly held United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which has
136

CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM,
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See id. (outlining implementation measures taken in the late 1950s, which were
deemed “cathartic” for participating states and useful, perhaps, to assess states’
efforts in light of community practice).
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Id. at 234.

convened every five years since its initial meeting in 1955 to address international issues
related to criminal justice.140
The response to the surveys was less than enthusiastic. Of the 123 states that had
joined the United Nations by 1967,141 only 44 replied to the initial survey distributed that
same year.142

As a result of this lukewarm response, the United Nations General

Assembly issued two resolutions in the 1970s, asking member nations to incorporate the
Standard Minimum Rules into their respective domestic penal laws.143

There were

discussions at the Fourth United Nations Congress in 1970 about redrafting and updating
the Standard Minimum Rules.144 The only significant update that resulted, however, was

140

See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 306;
see also Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 453 (1975)
(reviewing the initial surveys). Delegates of the American Correctional
Association attended the first United Nations Crime Conference and they continue
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supra note 55, at 89-90.
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United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 13, at 847 (citing The
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in the Light of Recent
Developments in the Correctional Field iv, 2-5, Report of Section III, SevereinCarlos Versele, Rapporteur, Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Kyoto, Japan, 17-26 August 1970)).

the addition of one rule designed to extend protections to pretrial detainees and persons
detained without charges.145
The 1974 survey yielded an improved return with 62 responses from United
Nations member states.146 In 1979, however, there was a low number of 38 responses
from United Nation members, which had grown by then to 152 states.147 No further
effort was made to encourage implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules until the
1980s.

In 1984, the Economic and Social Council of the UN approved a set of

Procedures for the Effective Implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners.148 Beginning in 1984, members of the United Nations were
required to report to the Secretary General every five years on the extent of
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules, the application of these rules, and the
“factors and difficulties, if any, affecting their implementation.”149 In 1984 there was an
increase in the number of survey responses to 62 member states, which was up from the
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(2nd ed. 1999) (citing ECOSOC Res. 2076 (LXII) (13 May 1977) (adding article
95 to ensure that persons arrested or imprisoned without charge should benefit
from most provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules).
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of Prisoners, May 25, 1984, E.S.C. Res. 1984/47, U.N. ESCOR, 76th Sess., Supp.
No. 1, at 29, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84).
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38 replies received in 1979,150 but still failed to demonstrate wide acceptance by a UN
membership that had grown to over 150 nations.
The year 1984 also saw the fruition of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the
“CAT”).151 Of great relevance to prisoners, the CAT recognizes the “inherent dignity of
the human person” and the international prohibition against torture and otherwise cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.152 Parties were required to submit an
initial report within one year, outlining steps taken to implement the treaty’s specific
articles,153 and to make subsequent reports every four years.154 The CAT has something
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See id. at 234, n.8.
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The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “CAT”), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100-200 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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Article 1 of the CAT prohibits “torture,” defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
Article 16 of the CAT prohibits “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment” that does not rise to the level of torture, but offers no definition as to
what kind of treatment fits within this prohibition. The United States ratified the
CAT on April 18, 1988, and it has been in effect since November 20, 1994.
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Reports are required by Article 19 of the CAT. The initial report by the United
States includes an overview of its criminal justice system, the legal mechanisms
protecting prisoners, and a discussion concerning conditions of confinement. See
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Committee Against Torture, Initial Reports of States Parties Due

that the Standard Minimum Rules do not — a means for investigation and the possibility
of some kind of sanction, even if it is only a denunciation of practices. In that regard, if
the United Nations Human Rights Committee receives “reliable information” that torture
is being “systematically practised in the territory of a state party,” it may undertake a
confidential inquiry.155 Parties that accede to a proposed Optional Protocol to the CAT
may be subject to a system of regular inspections for places of detention by a
subcommittee.156
The United Nations has expended additional efforts to extend protection tailored
to the interests of pretrial detainees or “remand” prisoners. On December 9, 1988, the
United Nations General Assembly approved the “Body of Principles for the Protection of
All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.”157 The Body of Principles
expressly applies to imprisoned persons, defined as those who have been “deprived of
personal liberty as a result of conviction for an offense.”158 Chiefly concerned with the
plight of political prisoners and those arbitrarily deprived of their liberty and held

in 1995 Addendum: United States of America, at ¶¶ 22-53, 138-155,
CAT/C/28/Add. 5 (9 Feb. 2000), available at: http://www.unhchr.ch.
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See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at §§ 3.53
– 3.54 (outlining the CAT reporting system).
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CAT, Art. 20. To date, only two such inquiries have been undertaken, in regard
to Egypt and Turkey. See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW,
supra note 24, at § 3.53.
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Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at
297, U.N. Doc. A/43/49, 1988).

158

Id.

incommunicado, the Body of Principles contains procedural safeguards not found in the
Standard Minimum Rules.159
In spite of these positive developments on behalf of prisoners in the mid-1980s,
interest in the Standard Minimum Rules continued to wane. In response to the 1989
survey, only 49 states replied to the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s
questionnaire on implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules, which represented less
than one-third of the then-existing United Nations membership.160 The low level of
responses to surveys distributed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council has
made it difficult to reach general conclusions about world-wide implementation, other
than the determination that there is a definite lack of fervor for the Standard Minimum
Rules.161
In a further effort to advance the “long-standing concern of the United Nations for
the humanization of the criminal justice and the protection of human rights,” the General
Assembly passed a resolution in 1990, containing a list of Basic Principles for the
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See Tulio Treves, The UN Body of Principles for the Protection of Detained or
Imprisoned Persons, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 578, 581-86 (1990) (outlining procedural
applicable during interrogations, after arrest, and detention on a criminal charge).
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the Foreign Offices and Justice Departments of the World.”).

Treatment of Prisoners.162 It is intended to serve as a “declaration on the human rights of
prisoners,” and to encourage members of the United Nations to fully implement the
Standard Minimum Rules.163 Also in 1990, the Eighth United Nations Crime Congress
attempted to require additional reports regarding the adoption of some other criminal
justice model rules.164 Reporting had ceased altogether by 1993, however, as the result of
apathy and limited resources.165
One factor that apparently has complicated the reporting process is the
proliferation of standards and human rights treaties. Many of the provisions found in the
162

Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, 45 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 199, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), reprinted in THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A
COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS 108-111 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni, ed., 1994).
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See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 255. In addition to reporting requirements for the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, states were asked to
report on implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial
Measures (the “Tokyo Rules”), the Guidelines for Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (the “Riyadh Guidelines”), the Standard Minimum Rules for the
protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, the Basic Principles on the Use
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, the Basic Principles on the
Role of Lawyers, and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors. See id.
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See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 259. The next survey was reportedly planned for
1993. See Report of the Secretary General, Eighth United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Implementation of the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, ¶ 110(e)
A/CONF.144/11 (19 July 1990). The proceedings of the Ninth United Nations
Crime Congress contain no report from the Secretary General and no explanation
for why a survey was not done. Since the Eighth Crime Congress in 1990, there
has been no further report from the UN Secretary General on implementation of
the Standard Minimum Rules. For a link to reports presented at all of the United
Nations Crime Congresses since 1955, see the website for the American Society
of Criminology, www.asc41.com.

Standard Minimum Rules overlap with those found in other instruments, such as the
above-referenced CAT, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or
ICCPR.166 Reports by state parties to these other international conventions include an
enquiry into the implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules.167

In answer to

concerns about the utility of the reporting regime, the United Nations Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice recommended revising its information-gathering
process in 1993.168 The first reporting cycle for this new process extended from 1996 to
2002, to enable member states sufficient time to provide replies for consideration by the
Commission.169 As of the Eleventh Annual Crime Congress in 2005, however, the
reports received “could not provide a precise account of the impact produced” by United
Nations standards, norms, and guidelines.170 Accordingly, it appears that the United

166
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1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). See S. Rep. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 (setting out the Senate’s advice and consent to
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See CLARK, UNITED NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 112, at 273 (observing that regular reports required by the
ICCPR include an inquiry into the implementation of the Standard Minimum
Rules); see also LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note
24, at §§ 3.49 – 3.50, 3.53 – 3.54 (discussing the state reporting requirement
under the ICCPR and the CAT in relation to prison conditions).
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See United Nations, Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and
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Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, at ¶¶ 25-26, A/CONF.203/8, Bangkok,
18-25 April 2005, available at www.asc41.com (citing E/CN.15/1992/4/Add.4).
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Commission received from member states.

Nations has gone back to the drawing board to develop a workable information-gathering
system.171
C.

Generalizations About the Status of the Standard Minimum Rules

Some generalizations about the Standard Minimum Rules are possible even in
light of lackluster compliance with the survey process. Interpreting the “sparse” results
of the 1989 survey, to which there were only 49 replies, one commentator has observed
that provisions 6 and 7 of the Standard Minimum Rules (emphasizing the principle of
non-discrimination and establishing a registration requirement for recording prisoners’
names) are the most widely accepted.172 There is reportedly “widespread” support for
provision 34, which places limits on the use of restraints, and “solid” support for
provision 31, which prohibits corporal punishment.173 The picture of implementation for
the remaining provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules, however, appears sketchy.174
It is fair to conclude from the underwhelming nature of the 1989 survey response that the
overall value of the information disclosed is, at best, “debatable.”175
In spite of the dispirited implementation efforts for the Standard Minimum Rules
as a whole, these guidelines have found utility in conjunction with other international
efforts to promote better treatment for prisoners. In making a comparison with other
171
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Id. at 170-74 (containing a table that illustrates the extent of implementation
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international instruments, a commentator has observed that the prohibitions of corporal
punishment found in provision 31 of the Standard Minimum Rules, as with the
prohibition against all cruel, inhuman, or degrading forms of punishment, are more than
merely advisory; rather, such prohibitions “reflect legal obligations” as a matter of
customary international law.176 Other provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules, by
contrast, are more easily seen as non-binding guidelines, such as provision 40, which
“requires a library ‘adequately stocked with both recreational and instructional
books.’”177 Acknowledging that not every provision may constitute a legal obligation, the
Standard Minimum Rules have served an important interpretive purpose:
Although not every rule may constitute a legal obligation, it is reasonably
clear

that the Standard Minimum Rules can provide guidance in

interpreting the general rule against cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Thus, serious non-compliance with some rules
or widespread non-compliance with some others may well result in a level
of ill-treatment sufficient to constitute violations of the general rule
[prohibiting cruel treatment].178
The Standard Minimum Rules can also provide guidance in interpreting the duty of
humane treatment and the respect for human dignity and the specific requirement found
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RODLEY, TREATMENT
145, at 280-81.
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Id. (quoting Standard Minimum Rule 40).
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OF

PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

in Article 10 of the ICCPR,179 which states that “the penitentiary system shall comprise
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social
rehabilitation.”180 Using the Standard Minimum Rules as an interpretive guideline for
norms found in other instruments may ameliorate the poor record of domestic
implementation.
In view of the uneven implementation process, it has been suggested that
converting the Standard Minimum Rules to a convention or a series of conventions would
enhance their status.181 This is unlikely to happen in view of the difficulty of achieving
international consensus, especially on issues closely related to internal, domestic matters.
It has been implied that the Standard Minimum Rules are so well-recognized as
international standards that a convention is not needed to achieve informal but “effective
local judicial recognition.”182 In the absence of a binding convention, however, states
remain free to implement their own standards regarding the treatment of prisoners or
simply to elect to do nothing. So far, efforts to evaluate domestic implementation of the
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Offenders, 1, 13-18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 43/3 (1970)), reprinted in LILLICH &
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 296-300.
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Standard Minimum Rules, as outlined above, have failed to provide a clear picture of
whether states have opted for the former or the latter.
Undeterred by the lack of fervor for the Standard Minimum Rules shown in the
survey replies, the United Nations continues to push in earnest for humane treatment of
prisoners. In recognition of the “pioneering role” of the Standard Minimum Rules and
the need for a binding instrument, the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice adopted a draft “Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners” in
2003.183 The proposed Charter outlines the following fundamental rights: (1) the right to
inherent dignity; (2) the right to separation, classification, and different legal treatment;
(3) the right to humane accommodation; (4) the right to decent food; (5) the right to
health and medical care; (6) the right to legal consultation, prompt and fair trial, equitable
sentencing, including non-custodial sanctions; (7) the right to independent inspections;
and (8) the right to reintegration.184 The proposed Charter does not announce anything
new.

The rights outlined therein simply regurgitate provisions found in existing

instruments such as the Standard Minimum Rules, the Basic Principles for the Treatment
of Prisoners, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, the UDHR, and the ICCPR.185 The resolution accompanying
the proposed draft Charter of Fundamental Rights invites consideration by member states
of the United Nations and other organizations in preparation for the Eleventh United
183
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Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which was held in Bangkok,
Thailand, in 2005.186 At that Conference, the United Nations celebrated the fiftieth
anniversary of the Standard Minimum Rules and their important role in improving the
administration of criminal justice by influencing the formulation of national or domestic
policies.187 No mention was made in that report, however, about the adoption of the
proposed Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners.
The well-intentioned efforts of the United Nations have not been ignored
completely and there are undoubtedly some good explanations for any particular
country’s seeming ambivalence towards implementing the Standard Minimum Rules for
domestic use. As explored further below, the United States and Europe make use of the
Standard Minimum Rules in different ways. In that respect, the United States has been
characterized as an example of the “limited success” enjoyed by the Standard Minimum
Rules, as only few references are found among the reported cases and the “enormous”
body of literature that has addressed the “outpouring of prisoner litigation” in this
country.188 Europe, by contrast, which has formally adopted the Standard Minimum
Rules by creating its own set of European Prison Rules, is depicted as an optimistic
example of the inspirational role that the Standard Minimum Rules have played.189 The
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following section of the paper compares legal regimes for prisoners’ rights in Europe,
which has implemented the Standard Minimum Rules wholesale by adopting its own
European Prison Rules, with the system in the United States, which has developed
standards of its own.
III.

LEGAL REGIMES FOR PROTECTING PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
Just as with the historical overview of penal reform, the legal systems for

protecting prisoners rights in the United States and Europe are fundamentally different
and involve distinctive concerns. Europe represents an “Old World” where states have
long histories and some have equally ancient prison facilities.190 The democracy in place
in the United States is only just over 225 years old and has seen nowhere near the
political upheaval as the so-called European Union, which continues to add members as it
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For example, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has found that the
following conditions at Spain’s ancient Metilla prison violated the right to human
dignity protected by Article 10(1) of the ICCPR, where the complainant had been
held in —
a 500-year old prison, virtually unchanged, infested with rats, lice,
cockroaches and diseases; 30 persons per cell, among them old men,
women, adolescents and an eight-month-old baby; no windows, but only
steel bars open to the cold and the wind; high incidence of suicide, selfmutilation, violent fights and beatings; human [feces] all over the floor as
the toilet, a hole in the ground, was flowing over; sea water for showers
and often for drink as well; urine-soaked blankets and mattresses to sleep
on in spite of the fact that the supply rooms were full of new bed linen,
clothes, etc.
RODLEY, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
145, at 291 (quoting Griffin v. Spain, 493/1992, UN doc. CCPR/C/57 (1996),
para. 3.1). The Human Rights Committee further found that, because the
complainant was subjected to these conditions for over seven months, the
conditions amounted to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment.
Id.

struggles to adopt uniform standards.191

This section of the paper will review the

prisoners’ rights regime in Europe and the United States in an effort to determine how
differences in the legal systems have resulted in objectively different levels of esteem for
the Standard Minimum Rules.
A.

Prison Standards and Prisoners’ Rights in Europe

As the epicenter of both world wars, Europe has had an acute interest in
improving human rights. The Council of Europe, which was formed immediately after
World War II in 1949, has grown from ten to forty-six member states.192 In addition to
the domestic legal systems of these members, Europe has developed regional
mechanisms for vindicating human rights, including the rights of prisoners. Europe, in
particular, responded to the United Nations’ encouragement by adopting the Standard
Minimum Rules outright in 1973.193 The European Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, which were eventually revised in 1987 and renamed the
European Prison Rules,194 work in tandem with two other important regional instruments
191

See Floyd Norris, It is European, But It Is Not A Union, N.Y. TIMES, March 3,
2006, at C1.
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Republic (1992), Slovakia (1992), Poland (1993), Romania (1994), Slovenia
(1994), Lithuania (1995), Albania (1996), Andorra (1996), Estonia (1996),
Ukraine (1997), Croatia (1997), Moldova (1997), the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (1997), Latvia (1997), Russia (1998), Georgia (1999), Armenia
(2002), Azerbaijan (2002), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2002), Serbia and
Montenegro (2004). See id. at 7.
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Prisoners, Resolution No. 73(5) (Jan. 19, 1973).
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Council of Europe, European Prison Rules, Recommendation No. R(87)3 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States (Strasbourg, Feb. 12, 1987).

that affect the rights of prisoners in Europe: the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “European Convention”);195 and the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (the “European Torture Convention”).196 Each facet of the European
system is discussed briefly below to describe how it protects prisoners’ rights.
1.

The European Prison Rules

The instrument that most directly affects the management of Europe’s prisons is
the European Prison Rules. The history and evolution of the European Prison Rules
reflects that Europe, as a region, accepted seriously the challenge posed by the United
Nations to improving human rights and the treatment of prisoners. In 1973, the regional
European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe adopted its own
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.197 As originally adopted, the
European Standard Minimum Rules closely paralleled the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules, but featured a “narrower framework” designed to reflect a “more liberal
common denominator than the one established at world level.”198 Thus, the European
version adopted “was envisaged as giving [the Standard Minimum Rules] a European
emphasis and reflecting the particular need and circumstances of the prison systems of
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(quoting Council of Europe Activities in the Field of Crime Problems 1956-1976,
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the member states of the Council of Europe.”199 Like the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules, the European version included a reporting requirement every five years
on member states’ progress with implementation.200
Unlike the Standard Minimum Rules, which have not been revised significantly
since 1955, the European rules have evolved and changed with time. From the inception
of the European rules, the drafters aspired to establish “a new, more creative and
distinctively European model.” 201 Noting “significant social trends and changes in regard
to prison treatment and management,” the Council of Europe adopted a revision to its
version of the Standard Minimum Rules in 1987.202 In doing so, the Council of Europe
consciously decided to advance emerging philosophical ideas that were a distinct product
of the “major post-war phenomena of a social and political nature, as well as the impact
of the developing thought and practice that had occurred in the penal field.”203
To summarize the unique European penal philosophy on which its rules are based,
the European Standard Minimum Rules set forth the following ideals: (a) that conditions
of confinement should not be punitive because deprivation of liberty was punishment
enough; (b) that treatment must be the principle aim of punishment; and (c) and that the
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“administration of prisons must show respect for the fundamental rights of individuals,
and at all times uphold the values that nourish human dignity.”204 To emphasize the
regional quality of the rules, the Council of Europe elected to rename the 1987 revision
the “European Prison Rules.”205
The content of the European Prison Rules remains very similar to the Standard
Minimum Rules.206 A significant effort was made in the revision process, however, to
take into account the experience in the implementation of the existing rules, the views
and proposals of member states, and the results of studies into specific aspects of penal
treatment and administration by the Council of Europe, as well as relevant ideas from
academia and professional experts, political, and public opinion.207 The most significant
aspect of the revised European Prison Rules is its enhanced preamble and explanatory
memorandum, which emphasizes the above-referenced European penal philosophy in
order to provide a greater “moral imperative,” to give the rules a “stronger philosophical
base,” and a “more credible operational validity.”208

To increase effectiveness, the

European Prison Rules set forth a more explicit regime of “regular inspections” and
monitoring by a “competent authority” to ensure compliance with the objectives and
requirements of the rules.209 Compliance is also aided by the increased availability of
204

Id. at 206-07.
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Id. at 210.
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See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.57.
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Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 208.

208

Id. at 208-10.

209

European Prison Rules, Rule 4 of the Basic Principles.

judicial review by a regional court set up to review potential human rights violations
under the European Convention.
2.

European Convention

The European Convention was implemented in 1950 to secure the universal
recognition and observance of the rights declared in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, including the right most relevant to prisoners to be free from torture and other
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.210 The European Convention
created a right of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights,
which was established in 1954, and the European Court of Human Rights, which was
established in 1959.211 Since 1999, a new version of the European Court of Human
Rights has jurisdiction over both admissibility and the merits of complaints alleging
violations of the Convention.212 The exclusive responsibility of the European Court of
Human Rights is to supervise the application of the European Convention through
hearing complaints by individuals or contracting states.213

Located in Strasbourg,

individuals have the option of seeking redress for violations of the European Convention
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See European Convention, Article 3.
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LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 5.
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LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.09.
Previously, applications were first submitted to the European Commission on
Human Rights and, if admissible and if not subject to resolution by way of
“friendly settlement,” then later by the European Court of Human Rights. Id. at
3.10.

213

See Kieran St. Clair Bradley, The European Court of Justice, in INSTITUTIONS OF
at 119 (John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, eds., 2002).
It is not to be confused with the European Court of Justice, which sits in
Luxembourg as the ultimate authority for the interpretation of legal acts affecting
the rules and practices of the European Community. See id.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

by filing a simple letter complaint or application with the European Court of Human
Rights, provided that they have first exhausted domestic remedies.214
Over time, the European Convention and the European Court of Human Rights
have had increased importance in protecting the rights of prisoners at the regional level.
Applications from persons in detention make up the majority of cases considered by the
European Court of Human Rights, which has defined a wide range of rights in the prison
context.215 The provision of the European Convention most applicable to the prisoner is
found in Article 3, which simply mandates as follows: “No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 3 provides no
definition for the type of treatment or punishment that is deemed torture as opposed to
that which constitutes inhuman or degrading, but cases interpreting Article 3 have
attempted to distinguish these concepts.
An overview of prisoner cases decided under the European Convention exceeds
the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is worth noting several decisions from the
European Court of Human Rights and its predecessor, the European Commission on
Human Rights, that have clarified what type of conditions constitute “inhuman or
degrading treatment” in violation of Article 3. Overcrowded, unsanitary, inadequately
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LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at §§ 3.09,
3.12, 3.25. The responsibility for ensuring that the rights guaranteed by the
European Convention are protected lies first with the member states. See id. at §
3.09.
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See id. at § 3.03. For example, decisions that have had a “significant impact” in
the United Kingdom include areas of disciplinary procedures, access to the courts
and the outside world, release procedures for “life sentence prisoner and prisoners
detained during Her Majesty’s Pleasure,” the treatment of detainees, prisoners’
rights to marry, and secrecy regarding prisons. Id.

ventilated, and pest-infested conditions have been found to violate Article 3.216 Lack of
adequate accommodations for a severely handicapped detainee has been found to violate
Article 3.217 Lack of access to prompt medical treatment or adequate psychiatric care
may also pose a violation of Article 3.218 Whether conditions rise to the level of torture
is a separate matter.219
An early case decided by the European Commission of Human Rights (the Greek
Case) made a distinction between torture and treatment that is considered inhuman or
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The Greek Case, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights No. 12,
1969; Dougoz v. Greece, Judgment of 6 March 2001; Peers v. Greece, Judgment
of 19 April 21. Kalashnikov v. Russia, Judgment of 15 July 2002.
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Price v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 July 2001.
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See, e.g., Hurtado v. Switzerland, Judgment of 26 January 1994 (finding that
states have a positive duty to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived
of their liberty, which duty requires adequate medical treatment); Ilhan v. Turkey,
Judgment of 27 June 2000 (finding that a 36-hour delay in providing medical care
to a visibly injured detainee was so cruel as to possibly amount to torture);
Keenan v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 3 April 2001 (finding that a mentally ill
prisoner who committed suicide was provided with inadequate psychiatric care);
compare with Tas v. Turkey, Judgment of 14 November 2000 (finding that
medical care was promptly provided for a detainee); Rehbock v. Slovenia,
Judgment of 28 November 2000 (finding that failure to provide pain-killing
medication on occasions where the prisoner had suffered a double fracture of his
jaw did not violate Article 3).

219

Torture is more frequently associated with custodial interrogation by police.
Conditions of custodial confinement, by contrast, are typically examined under
the norm that prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. It is recognized,
nevertheless, that conditions of punishment can be so severe as to constitute
torture. See, e.g., Rod Morgan, The European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, reprinted in
IMPRISONMENT TODAY AND TOMORROW at 727 (discussing torture as reserved for
“specialized, or exotic, forms of violence purposefully employed . . . to gain a
confession or information or to intimidate or humiliate, and involving severe
pain” as opposed to ill-treatment while in “non-police” settings).

degrading based on the nature and severity of the treatment.220

In that case, the

Commission found that “inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately
causes suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation is unjustifiable.”221
Torture, by contrast, was considered an “aggravated form of inhuman treatment.”222
Since the Greek Case, the European Court of Human Rights made a similar analytical
distinction between torture and ill-treatment in a case that addressed the use of five
specific interrogation techniques designed to cause disorientation and sensory
deprivation.223

The European Court decided that these techniques were not torture

because the suffering inflicted was not sufficiently severe, but that the techniques were
nonetheless degrading and cruel in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention.224
220

The Greek Case, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights No. 12,
1969. See LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at
341-407 (dedicating an entire chapter – Problem V – to the situation in Greece
and the different responses by the international community, including the United
Nations Human Rights committee and the European Commission of Human
Rights, culminating in the Greek Case).
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Anthony Cullen, Defining Torture in International Law: A Critique of the
Concept Employed by the European Court of Human Rights, 34 CAL. W. INT’L L.
J. 29, 35 (2003) (quoting The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 186
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R.)).
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Id. The Greek Case further defines degrading treatment as that which “grossly
humiliates” a person “before others or drives him to act against his will or
conscience.” Forti II rejects this definition as “too abstract” to define a violation
of customary international law. 694 F. Supp. at 712.

223

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1980) (involving members of a
terrorist group – the Irish Republican Army – who were detained in police
custody). The case concerned the following techniques employed by British
Security Forces for the purpose of extracting information: (a) wall standing for
extended periods in a “stress position”; (2) hooding of detainees heads while not
in interrogation; (3) subjection to continuous loud noise; (4) deprivation of sleep;
and (5) deprivation of food and drink. Id. at ¶ 96.

224

Id. at ¶ 174.

Thus, whether treatment constitutes “torture” or “inhuman and degrading treatment” in
violation of Article 3 is a matter of degree in severity, depending entirely on the
circumstances.225
Applying this standard to a case involving prison conditions, the European Court
of Human Rights appears to have clarified that conditions of confinement, standing alone,
concern primarily the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.226

The Court explained that “ill-treatment, including punishment, must

attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3.”227 The
Court elaborated that treatment is inhuman in violation of Article 3 “if it is applied for
hours at a stretch and caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and
mental suffering[.]”228 Treatment is considered “degrading” in violation of Article 3 if it
is “such as to arouse in [its] victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of
humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral

225

Id. at ¶ 162; see also LILLICH & HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 9, at 765 (discussing the Irish case and the distinction between “torture” as
opposed to “inhuman and degrading treatment”).

226

In re Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). The Soering case, however, is not
without political overtones. The Soering case involved a proceeding in which the
United States sought extradition of a German national who was in custody of the
United Kingdom to face charges in the State of Virginia for a gruesome capital
murder that he confessed to committing. Id. at ¶¶ 11-26. Because the offense
carried a possible death sentence, the court in Soering examined conditions at the
Mecklenburg Correctional Center in Virginia and considered whether the risk of
exposing a prisoner to “death row phenomenon” would violate the prohibition
found in Article 3 of the European Convention against extraditing someone where
the subject might be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment. Id. at ¶ 93.

227

Id. at ¶ 100.

228

Id.

resistance.”229 The Court declined to find, however, that these conditions constituted
torture.230
Prisoners have a wide variety of rights under the European Convention. What this
review shows, however, is that a judicial inquiry in a prisoner case before the European
high court for human rights is more likely to focus on whether the complained of
condition constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment unless the its consequences are so
severe as to qualify as torture. European courts are aided in this enquiry by the existence
of the European Torture Convention and a committee that undertakes to prevent torture
by regularly inspecting places of detention in Europe.
3.

The European Torture Convention

Europe plainly recognizes that torture is one of the most serious human rights
violations, that it is considered a peremptory norm, and that this norm cannot be

229

Id.

230

The Soering Court noted that prisoners on death row experience delay before their
executions while they exhaust their appellate and collateral remedies and opined
that the delay is accompanied by “increasing tension and psychological trauma.”
Id. at ¶ 105. In addition, the petitioner in Soering expressed fear that he might
face homosexual abuse and physical attack from other prisoners on death row. Id.
at ¶ 107. Adopting the so-called “death row phenomenon,” the Soering court
ultimately concluded that the “very long period of time spent on death row in such
extreme conditions, with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting
execution of the death penalty,” in light of the personal circumstances of the
youthful and purportedly vulnerable offender, “exposed him to a real risk of
treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3.” Id. at ¶ 111. Today there
is a split of authority about whether lengthy detention on death row, without the
existence of compelling circumstances, violates important civil rights. See
Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Comm. No. 555/1993, CCPR/C/61/D/555/1993
(15 January 1998) (discussing detailed views set forth in Errol Johnson v.
Jamaica, Comm. No. 588/1994 (22 March 1996)); see also LILLICH & HANNUM,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 760 (citing cases on both sides).

derogated from even in time of war or emergency.231 The European Torture Convention,
which came into force in 1989, recites the prohibition found in Article 3 of the European
Convention, emphasizing that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”

232

Unlike the United Nations Convention Against

Torture, however, the European Torture Convention has no definition of what constitutes
torture or what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which is
sometimes referred to generally as “ill treatment.”233 The definition of what type of
treatment constitutes torture or ill treatment has been formed in practice by the committee
designed to monitor compliance.234
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Torture is prohibited by Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well
as by the United Nations Convention Against Torture. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 867, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (The prohibition against torture is so universally
recognized that “the torturer has become — like the pirate and slave trader before
him — hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”); LIVINGSTONE, OWEN,
& MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.41.
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Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 126 (26 Nov. 1987). To date, the European
Torture Convention has been ratified by forty-five of the European Council’s
forty-six member states. See LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 192, at 3. Monaco signed the Convention on October 5, 2004, but had
not ratified it by 2005. See id. at 7, n.29. Protocol No. 1 of the European Torture
Convention, which came into force on March 1, 2002, allows the Committee of
Ministers for the Council of Europe to invite non-member states to accede to the
Convention. See id. at 3.
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See MALCOLM D. EVANS AND ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE: A STUDY OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 98 (1998).
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See LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.41
(noting that jurisprudence on Article 3 of the European Convention has played a
part in forming a working definition, but that the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture views its mandate as more extensive, extending to “general
conditions of imprisonment in so far as they may give rise to at least a risk of
degrading treatment”).

Compliance with the European Torture Convention is monitored by the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture or Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (the “CPT”).235 To encourage compliance, the CPT conducts periodic and ad
hoc follow-up inspection visits to places of detention, including prisons, police stations,
and psychiatric hospitals.236

From these visits the CPT has developed a body of

jurisprudence consisting of its reports.237 The reports are confidential unless the state
requests that it be published, which a large majority have been.238 The reports typically
include a request for the state to report back to the CPT within a year on the steps it has
taken to comply with any recommendations made.239 If a state fails to comply, or
otherwise proves un-cooperative, the CPT may issue a public statement.240

Public

statements have been issued, for example, with respect to conditions of detention in
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LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 3.
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See id. at 3. Interestingly, under Article 17(3), the CPT does not visit places that
“representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (the “ICRC”)
‘effectively visit on a regular basis by virtue of the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 18 June 1977 thereto’.”
LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24 at § 3.43.
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LEACH, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 192, at 3. These reports
are confidential, but may be published with the agreement of the contracting state.
See id.
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LIVINGSTONE, OWEN, & MCDONALD, PRISON LAW, supra note 24, at § 3.44
(noting that, as of the CPT’s Twelfth Annual Report, 89 of 129 submitted reports
have been made public).
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Id.

240

Id.

Turkey, and the failure of Russian authorities to co-operate with some aspects of an
inquiry into conditions of detention in the Chechen Republic.241
Since its inception, lack of definition has posed both a problem and an
opportunity for the CPT and its ability to carve out distinctions between torture and lesser
forms of ill treatment.242

Absent immutable

propositions that restrict its range of

activities, CPT remains free to test the limits of the prohibition found in Article 3 “by
exploring – and revealing – the range of circumstances which potentially might be
considered as within its ambit.”243

This means that CPT has a virtually unfettered

mandate to investigate. To assist in its mission, the CPT has developed its own set of
prison standards.244 The CPT Standards, which consist of extracts from substantive
sections of the CPT’s general reports, are disjointed and contain no precise definition of
torture or ill treatment.245

The CPT Standards do attempt, however, to identify

conditions and practices that represent cause for concern, such as overcrowding.246
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Id.

242

See EVANS AND MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE, supra note 233, at 73
(observing that, because there is no clear understanding in the drafting history of
what was meant in Article 3 by “torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,” the preventative mechanism established by the CPT “is built on
sand”).
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Id.

244

See Council of Europe, The CPT Standards, CPT/Inf/E (2002), Rev. 2003,
available at: www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.doc.
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For example, without attempting to define ill-treatment, the CPT Standards
simply recognize that “[i]ll-treatment can take numerous forms, many of which
may not be deliberate but rather the result of ]organizational] failings or
inadequate resources.” Id. at 17.
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See id.

Thus, the CPT Standards supply a much needed level of detail about what kinds of
conditions and treatment are preferable and what kinds are unacceptable.247
4.

Continued Progress of the European Prison Rules

The Council of Europe continues to revise its European Prison Rules to keep up
with changes in its ever-growing region, evolution of penal practices, and information
obtained in the implementation process. On January 11, 2006, the Council of Europe
reportedly adopted a new recommendation to update the European Prison Rules to take
into account recent case law by the European Court of Human Rights

as well as

standards developed by the CPT.248 The newly revised version of the European Prison
Rules, which reportedly features a separate section on inspection and monitoring by
government and independent bodies at a national and local level,249 has the potential to be
an even more powerful instrument for prison reform that the 1987 version, in part,
because of the CPT and its inspection activities.250
The Council of Europe has also proposed a European Prison Charter, which is
reportedly less comprehensive than the European Prison Rules, but binding like a
247

For example, the CPT Standards broadly state that “[r]eady access to proper toilet
facilities and the maintenance of good standards of hygiene are essential
components of a humane environment.” Id. at 18. The CPT specifically
expresses its dislike for the practice of “slopping out,” which is employed in many
European countries that do not provide prisoners with access to toilets, forcing
those prisoners to use a bucket in their cells to discharge human waste. See id.
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Professor Dirk van Zyl Smit has acted as an expert to assist the Council of Europe
in revising the rules, the first draft of which was proposed in 2004.
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Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Human Rights and Best Practice as Factors in
Prison Reform at 11 (Paper presented at the 14th World Congress on Criminology,
Philadelphia,
U.S.A.,
August
2005),
available
at:
www.worldcriminology2005.org/vanZylSmit.doc.
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See id. at 4.

treaty.251 The need for a binding prison charter highlights a lingering problem with all
systems based on soft model guidelines or standards: lack of enforceability. Unless the
European Prison Rules are adopted and implemented in domestic law they are not
enforceable. If the process of adopting a convention on prisoners’ rights is as fraught
with problems as the proposed European Constitution, which remains unratified by all of
the member states, it remains to be seen whether consensus on a regional prison charter
can be obtained.
B.

Prison Standards and Prisoners’ Rights in the United States

Turning to the United States, which for the most part has not adopted the Standard
Minimum Rules wholesale, a review of the regime of standards and rights applicable to
prisoners appears similar in many respect to the system in place in Europe. The United
States has a long history of prison standards, many of which pre-date the Standard
Minimum Rules. Prisoners in the United States also have a variety of protections found
in the Bill of Rights attached to the United States Constitution, which had even greater
effect following the passage of important civil rights legislation in 1964. Similar to
detention facilities in Europe, prisons and jails in the United States may be subjected to
intermittent inspections for the purpose of accreditation, which monitors compliance with
standards and constitutional guidelines.

These features are discussed below before

commenting on the status of the Standard Minimum Rules in the United States.
1.

Early Standards

In contrast to Europe, the Standard Minimum Rules have not been formally
adopted in most United States jurisdictions. This does not mean, however, that United
251

See id. at 7, 11.

States prison systems are lacking in standards to govern conditions of confinement.
Many of the prison standards that are still in use in the United States today pre-date the
ones found in the Standard Minimum Rules adopted in 1955, and those which were
adopted in Europe in 1973. The 1870 Declaration of Principles published at the first
National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati are credited
as “the basis for the development of standards in corrections.”252 As noted above, the
ACA published its Manual of Suggested Standards for a State Correctional System in
1946.253 Subsequently, the ACA issued revised versions of its Manual of Correctional
Standards in 1954, 1959, and 1966, as well as many other publications related to
correctional administration, rehabilitative treatment, and professional issues.254
The Standard Minimum Rules have not been without influence on the ACA
standards. In the last revised version of its Manual, the ACA expressly adopted a
“statement of ‘minimum standards to govern correctional officials in dealing with the
rights of prisoners’” that was “drawn in the main from the Standard Minimum Rules.255
Thus, the ACA Manual of Correctional Standards has been hailed as containing
guidelines that are “identical or parallel” to the Standard Minimum Rules.256
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TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 97.
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Id. at 98.
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Id. at 84-85, 88, 97-99. For example, the ACA published a Handbook on
Classification in Correctional Institutions in 1947, which was later updated.
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AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS 266-67(3rd ed. 1966).
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See Besharov & Mueller, Demands of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and the
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 13, at 852 (observing that
“[t]he Manual of Correctional Standards, issued by the American Correction
Association which represents American professional opinion on the subject has

MANUAL

OF

CORRECTIONAL

The ACA standards reportedly worked well until the mid 1960s, when something
changed that would alter the course of corrections in the United States.257 That event was
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1983 of which established a
remedy for constitutional violations by state actors such as correctional officials.258 Thus
began the end of the so-called “hands-off” era of prisoners’ rights in the United States as
prison administrators became obliged to go beyond standards to follow practices and
policies that complied with constitutional requirements.
2.

Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation

As with the rights outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights, the
United States Constitution has many provisions in its Bill of Rights that are of great
benefit to persons deprived of their liberty. Notably, the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution succinctly prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment.259
According precedent from the United States Supreme Court, the original intent of the
drafters “was to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”260

identical or parallel standards to . . . the [Standard Minimum Rules”) (citing the
AMERICAN CORRECTION ASS’N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS (3d ed.
1966)).
257

TRAVISONO AND HAWKES, supra note 55, at 99 (commenting on the evolution of
standards through the 1960s and the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

259

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

260

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Granucci, Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842
(1969)). Initially, the Eighth Amendment was used to challenge methods of
execution and “concededly inhuman techniques of punishment.” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 102 (citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (“[I]t is safe to
affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that is excessive under the theory that a
disproportionate penalty is cruel and unusual.261 The prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment also has been extended to cover prison conditions and the treatment accorded
to prisoners after sentence has been imposed. 262
Nevertheless, prisoners in the United States did not always have standing to
challenge cruel conditions of confinement in a court of law. Prisoners in the United
States were once considered “slaves of the state” with few rights, if any.263 For a long
time the courts accorded virtually unfettered deference to prison administrators over dayto-day management decisions. This “[hands-off] attitude toward problems of prison
administration” was justified, in part, because of the recognition that increased
interference by the courts would result an unwieldy system of judicial micromanagement:

unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth Amendment] . . .”); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death . . . .”)).
261

For example, the Supreme Court has recently excluded the use of capital
punishment for offenders who committed heinous capital crimes before the age of
eighteen. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Likewise, offenders
whose sub-average intelligence meets the criteria for mental retardation are
exempt from the death penalty under the theory that executing persons who lack
the mental capacity to appreciate the heinous nature of their actions as cruel. See
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

262

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 290-91 (“The infliction of . . . unnecessary suffering is
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern
legislation codifying the common-law view that ‘[i]t is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his
liberty, care for himself.’”) (footnote and citations omitted).

263

Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871); see also United
States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 711-713 (7th Cir. 1973) (rejecting
the view once held by some state courts that a prison inmate is a mere slave).

[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative
and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are
ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no
more than a healthy sense of realism.264
During the 1960s, however, prisoner litigation increased with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the recognition that Section 1983 of that Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983, could afford a remedy in federal court for constitutional violations
committed by officials acting under “color of law.”265
As increased attention to civil rights extended to the prison environment, the
United States Supreme Court signaled an end to the hands-off era, confirming that “[a]
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for
crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
264

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-405 (1974) (footnote omitted).

265

Section 1983 of United States Code Title 42 provides that “Every person who,
under colour of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.” Section 1983 applies to state officers who
act under colour of state law. See Monell v. Department of Social Srvs., 436 U.S.
651 (1978); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Civil rights suits against
federal officials for constitutional violations are available under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

country.”266 The demise of the hands-off era and the rise of prisoners’ rights triggered a
revolution that would transform prison systems within the United States.267 Several state
prison systems were declared unconstitutional and placed under court-supervised
monitoring.268 Indeed, by 1993 nearly forty states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands were under some form of court supervision or consent
decree as the result of prisoner civil rights lawsuits.269 Twelve jurisdictions were under
court orders covering their entire systems.270
With increased funds from state legislatures that were required to bring state penal
systems in line with constitutional requirements, the civil rights revolution
unquestionably has improved prison conditions throughout the United States.271 These
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By 1995, the number of states subject to a court order or consent decree dropped
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improvements are monitored extensively by a variety of professional and governmental
organizations, which have been charged with updating standards and inspecting prison
and jail facilities for compliance. Non-governmental prisoners’ rights organizations also
continue to monitor compliance with court-imposed mandates with the goal of initiating
litigation to obtain redress for conditions that fall below constitutionally acceptable
standards.272
3.

Continued Development of Standards and the Accreditation
Process

Since the prisoner civil rights revolution, there has been a plethora of standards
published for use in United States prison and detention facilities.

The American

Correctional Association has continued to publish standards for a variety of different
settings, including correctional institutions, jails, and adult local detention facilities.273
The United States Bureau of Prisons issued a set of standards that generally approximate

entire prison system. See id. The advent of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the
“PLRA”) in 1996, has made it easier for states to terminate consent decrees
involving prison conditions.
272

A good example of a private prisoners’ rights advocacy group is the American
Civil Liberties Union and its National Prison Project, which operates a national
litigation program on behalf of prisoners in the United States.
See
www.aclu.org/prison. Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) and Human
Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) are two other non-governmental organizations that
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Programs (1995); ACA, Standards for Small Jail Facilities (1989). Additional
publications by the ACA can be found at their website, www.aca.org.

the Standard Minimum Rules.274 Model rules for jail administration have also been
issued by the National Sheriffs’ Association.275

The United States Department of

Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau has a set of
guidelines and standards for its immigration detention centers.276 Private prison facilities
in the United States, such as those run by the Corrections Corporation of America, are
also subject to stringent standards.277

State, local, and municipal authorities also

frequently compose their own standards for jail facilities.278
Prison standards also have been developed by professionals other than those
charged with penal administration. The American Bar Association (the “ABA”) has
issued a detailed set of standards concerning the legal status of prisoners and the
conditions of their confinement, which includes commentary, cites to related standards
developed by the American Correctional Association, and case citations.279 The useful
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standards covering the legal status of prisoners in 1972. See id. at 4. After a

and informative standards established after years of study by the ABA are frequently
referenced by the courts in connection with cases filed by prisoners.280
In addition to issuing its correctional standards, the American Correctional
Association also sponsors an inspection and accreditation program.

Through its

Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, the ACA offers a private, voluntary
certification program to which corrections facilities may apply for ACA accreditation.281
Accreditation is based on demonstrated compliance with standards adopted by the
ACA.282 Facilities are accredited for a period of three years following an audit or
inspection of the facility by representatives of the ACA, which will assess the strengths
and weaknesses of a correctional facility in a wide variety of categories, and requires
accredited facilities to make an annual certification thereafter to confirm continued
compliance.283 Like the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the ACA is

series of tentative drafts, they were approved by the ABA House of Delegates on
February 9, 1981. See id. at 5; see also American Bar Association, Standards
Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377 (1977)
(setting out the contents of Tentative Draft No. 4).
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not a judicial body with power to sanction institutions who fail to comport with its
standards. The ACA has no authority to require a correctional facility to adopt any
procedure or to change any existing procedure.284 The ACA’s sole authority is to deny
accreditation, or to withdraw accreditation from any facility found not to be in
compliance with ACA standards.285
Although the ACA lacks enforcement capabilities, obtaining ACA accreditation is
viewed as a significant accomplishment.286 ACA accreditation has been hailed by courts
as useful to show a “good faith” effort by prison officials to improve prison conditions.287
Failure to achieve ACA accreditation is also a relevant consideration during litigation.288
Maintaining ACA accreditation has been a condition of court ordered injunctive relief for
deficient prison conditions.289 Compliance with ACA standards is not, however, per se
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evidence that conditions meet constitutional requirements.290 As the Supreme Court has
stated regarding the ACA and other jail standards, “while the recommendations of these
various groups may be instructive . . . , they simply do not establish the constitutional
minima; rather they establish goals recommended by the organization in question.”291
4.

Status of the Standard Minimum Rules in the United States

Even without wholesale implementation, the Standard Minimum Rules clearly
have not played an unimportant part of the increased application of rights to prisoners and
the improvement of prison conditions. For example, a hallmark of the modern prison
reform movement can be traced to the 1971 rebellion at the Attica State Prison in New
York.292 Having seized hostages, the prisoners made a set of demands for amnesty and
safe transportation from confinement.293 A committee of outside observers met with the
inmates in an effort to negotiate a peaceful end to the uprising.294 Prison officials agreed
to a set of proposals for improved prison conditions.295 When the inmates rejected the
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proposed settlement of penal reform measures, an assault ensued to retake the prison.296
Thirty-two inmates and eleven prison employees who had been taken hostage were killed
in the siege.297 As commentators have observed, the reforms proposed during the Attica
uprising mirrored many of the guidelines offered by the Standard Minimum Rules.298
Yet, the Standard Minimum Rules have not been fully implemented in the United
States, which is to say that the United States has not formally adopted them as part of its
domestic law. After the Attica rebellion, a few individual states within the United States
expressly adopted the Standard Minimum Rules.299 Most states, however, have not done
so. In 1971, there was a bill introduced in the United States Congress to enact the
principles of the Standard Minimum Rules into domestic legislation.300

It was not

successful. To date, the federal government has not formally adopted the Standard
Minimum Rules, although federal standards supposedly approximate the Rules.301
296

Id. at 333.
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(1980)).

Likewise, principles of the Standard Minimum Rules are reportedly comparable to those
incorporated into the 1962 Model Penal Code and the correctional standards developed in
1973 by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
suggesting an influence.302
Apart from their influence on existing prison standards, the Standard Minimum
Rules have been invoked by courts looking for guidance within the United States. Actual
discussion of the Standard Minimum Rules, however, is scarce.

For the most part

domestic courts have pointed to the Standard Minimum Rules as evidence of customary
international law.303 In that respect, courts in the United States have limited the role of
the Standard Minimum Rules to informational or advisory of what constitutes accepted
state practice.

The United States Supreme Court has characterized the Standard

Minimum Rules as evidence of “contemporary standards of decency” of the sort that
informs an Eighth Amendment analysis.304 The Court has stopped short, however, of
equating guidelines found in the Standard Minimum Rules with constitutional
requirements. In another case, the Supreme Court has viewed the Standard Minimum
Rules in a more limited manner as instructive recommendations, but not as establishing a
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constitutional minimum.305 Standards such as those issued by the American Correctional
Association are viewed similarly as guidelines for what is considered appropriate prison
administration,306 but not equal to what is constitutionally required.307
Although courts in the United States appear to have given the Standard Minimum
Rules short shrift, this does not necessarily mean that the United States fails to comport
with the guidelines provided therein. It is possible to discern through a brief review of
the standards published by the ACA and the ABA, as well as major court decisions
enlarging the constitutional rights of prisoners, that the major substantive provisions
found in the Standard Minimum Rules have achieved implementation in the United
States, even if at a piecemeal pace. As this review attempts to show, the principles
advanced by the Standard Minimum Rules are recognized and adequately protected in the
United States by comprehensive professional standards and court rulings on prison
conditions without the need for actual implementation as that term is understood by the
United Nations.
C.

Observations
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A comparison of Europe and the United States shows that both employ standards
in an effort to improve conditions within their prison systems. There are a couple of
explanations for the differing levels of esteem that the Standard Minimum Rules appear
to have enjoyed in these regimes.

One factor is the existence of comprehensive

correctional standards that pre-date the Standard Minimum Rules, which explains why
the United States has declined to adopt the spartan guidelines approved by the United
Nations whereas Europe has embraced them wholesale. Another factor is the differing
level of judicial control over prison issues within these jurisdictions, which may explain
why standards occupy a predominant place of importance in Europe. These observations
are discussed briefly below.
1.

Pre-Existing Comprehensive Standards

The differing degree of influence that the Standard Minimum Rules have had
within the legal systems in Europe and the United States is, in part, an issue of timing.
When the Standard Minimum Rules were formally adopted at the First United Nations
Crime Congress in 1955, the 1870 Declaration of Principles were already firmly
established and ensconced within professional organizations operating in the United
States.

Based on the 1870 Declaration of Principles, the American Correctional

Association had already published at least two comprehensive manuals of correctional
standards in 1946 and 1954, before the Standard Minimum Rules were formally adopted.
During the time that professional organizations such as the ACA were issuing
correctional standards, Europe was being torn asunder by decades of war. Adopting the
Standard Minimum Rules wholesale made sense to Europe, but not necessarily for the
United States, which already had standards that approximated the Standard Minimum

Rules in principle and exceeded them in terms of detail even before the civil rights
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.
Europe’s decision to adopt the Standard Minimum Rules wholesale, while
undoubtedly beneficial, has not been without difficulty. The level of detail found in the
Standard Minimum Rules, or the lack thereof, has forged a critical difference between the
prison standards found in Europe and the United States that has proven detrimental. Like
the Standard Minimum Rules, the European Prison Rules are vague in character, which
has made the European Prison Rules less useful. Comprehensive standards such as those
formulated by the ACA and the ABA, which take into consideration judicial rulings
about constitutionally required standards for the treatment of prisoners, are seen as more
useful in their application by prison officials and as guidelines for courts to follow
concerning what is generally accepted as good practice.
One commentator has noted this contrast between prison standards in the United
States and Europe and has made a connection between lack of detail and the problem of
enforceability. “The specificity of some of these American codes of standards has a
direct bearing on the question of compliance.”308 Where comprehensive standards exist,
“[t]here is less room for varying interpretations, a problem besetting the European Prison
Rules, whose vague wording and qualified statements of principle create loopholes and
allow circumvention.”309 This commentator has also noted that standards and systems of
accreditation have a place in developing “good practice” in the correctional context, but
that standards are “no substitute for a system which obliges compliance” such as the one
308

Silvia Casale, Conditions and Standards, in PRISONS AFTER WOOLF: REFORM
THROUGH RIOT at 74 (Elaine Player and Michael Jenkins, eds., 1994).
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Id.

in place in the United States, for which the system of accreditation operates against a
background of minimum standards at the federal, state, and local level, and which also
features active judicial intervention to enforce those standards.310
The growing body of jurisprudence by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (the CPT) further illustrates how the vague character of the
European Prison Rules detracts from their effectiveness. It has been observed that,
whereas the European Prison Rules are seen as vague and unhelpful, the impact of the
specific comments and general reports made annually by the CPT have provided a guide
to “European ‘good practice’ in relation to prison conditions and regimes and appear to
have greater influence on the decisions of [the European Court of Human Rights] than the
European Prison Rules . . . .”311

Thus, judicial enforcement is also aided by the

availability of comprehensive standards.
Another factor that militates against adopting the Standard Minimum Rules at this
point is that they are out of date. As one commentator has observed, their dated character
leaves the Standard Minimum Rules “vulnerable to criticism” and, perhaps more
importantly, they lack a “compelling underlying rationale” which further diminishes
their application and influence.312 Given the small number of nations that responded to
the periodic surveys issued by the United Nations, revisions to the Standard Minimum
Rules are not likely. Therefore, future progress with respect to guidelines regulating
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Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 207.

prison conditions almost certainly will be at the regional level.313 To its credit, Europe
has at least attempted to remedy this deficiency with updated revisions that are tailored to
regional needs while advancing a distinct philosophy that is relevant to the area of
geographic application. Because the United States finds itself with a plethora of welldeveloped standards by professional organizations, as well as federal, state, and local
authorities, there is little incentive at this point to adopt the antiquated Standard
Minimum Rules.
2.

Differing Levels of Judicial Control

Another reason that the Standard Minimum Rules have thrived in Europe is that
the role of the judiciary appears less prominent than in the United States, where prison
reform has been driven by court intervention or, as some would say, judicial activism.
Although the European Court of Human Rights has issued many important decisions
concerning prisoners’ issues, there are some significant limitations to review by the
Strasbourg court. Less than 25 percent of the applications submitted ultimately have
been found admissible.314 In that respect, limits on admissibility require a party to
exhaust all available domestic remedies and to file his or her application with the
European Court of Human Rights within six months of the domestic tribunal’s final
decision.315 An application may be deemed inadmissible if it appears “manifestly illfounded,” such as if the allegations do not disclose an arguable breach of the
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Convention.316

There are other limits on admissibility found in Article 35 of the

European Convention, which has been amended recently in an effort to further restrict the
European Court’s burgeoning workload.317
Apart from the European Court of Human Rights it is less clear what role, if any,
that domestic courts in European member states have had in extending the rule of law to
prisoner complaints about conditions of confinement. Europe, as in the United States,
had adopted a “hands-off” attitude toward prisoner litigation in the past.318 The United
Kingdom, for example, did not extend court jurisdiction over a complaint against the
government agency responsible for supervising prisoners until 1979.319 Domestic courts
in the United Kingdom did not become active in extending rights to prisoners until the
1980s.320

316

Id. at § 3.32 (citing Article 35(3) of the European Convention).

317
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European Convention).
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The legal status of prisoners differs among the European states depending on
whether a country’s prison system is part of a political system in which oversight is
conducted by administrative, legislative, or executive departments, as opposed to prison
systems that also operate under a system of judicial oversight.321 Some countries have no
judicial control over prison conditions, others have limited amounts of judicial control,
while still others have significant judicial control.322
France is one example of a country with significant judicial control over
prisons.323 Since 1958, each French prison has been assigned a judge who has both
administrative and judicial functions in the prison setting.324 Because the level of judicial
control is so strong, the political influence over prisons in France is weak. There is no
political control over prisons at the national level, leaving their regulation to local
authorities.325

Spanish prisoners are also subject to significant amounts of judicial

control.326 In Spain, prisoners have the right to complain to prison administration, the
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AND

courts, an ombudsman, the prosecutor, or any other public authority.327 Similarly, all
prison decisions made by German authorities are subject to judicial review.328
In contrast to the domestic legal systems found in France, Spain, and Germany,
judicial control is limited in Sweden, which instead emphasizes political control in the
form of an ombudsman.329 The role of courts is down played in the Swedish system.330
Individual cases decided by central prison administration can be appealed to an
administrative court.331 Prisoners also have the option to appeal to an ombudsman.332
Austria is another example of a jurisdiction that operates primarily under a system of
political control, in which prisoner complaints are handled by the head of the institution
and complaints against the head of the institution are addressed by the Federal Ministry
of Justice.333
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2001).
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As this shows, the presence of a strong judiciary can translate into weak control of
prisons at the administrative level. By contrast, countries with strong administrative
control often feature a very limited judicial role. The limited availability of judicial
review for prisoner complaints within some domestic systems in Europe increases the
importance of the European Court of Human Rights as a forum. These limitations also
increase the importance of continued efforts by the Council of Europe to promulgate a
revised version of the European Prison Rules as well as the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and its inspection regime, which has produced its own set of
guidelines in the CPT Standards. Comparatively speaking, it can be concluded from a
review of the European system that wherever local judicial control is less prominent,
standards are a more important tool for ensuring minimum levels of acceptable treatment
for prisoners, while affording less in the way of individual rights. Thus, standards may
be more important for protecting prisoners rights where administrative control is more
prevalent than judicial control. This may explain why in the United States, where courts
are unlikely to fully cede an interest in monitoring prison compliance with constitutional
requirements, standards have lesser importance than they do in Europe.
CONCLUSION
What this paper has attempted to show is that Europe and the United States both
have prison standards in place, and that these standards have been influenced by the
Standard Minimum Rules in different ways for good reasons. These differences reveal
the strengths and the weaknesses of using model rules or guidelines as a source of law.
The United States has a variety of well-developed, comprehensive prison standards that
stem from the 1870 Declaration of Principles and an equally long history of reform

movements that date back to the very first penitentiary built in the late 1700s. Even with
this longstanding interest in the evolution of humane standards, however, significant
reform arguably has required court involvement in many instances. Thus, while prison
standards have been important factors in ensuring humane prison conditions, effective
reform of prison conditions sometimes has required other mechanisms such as a regime
of regular inspection or accreditation as well as the availability of judicial intervention.
In this respect, the European system of prison standards, which has been strengthened by
the European Convention and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, is
no different from the one in the United States.
It is undisputed that the Standard Minimum Rules, in spite of their advisory, nonbinding status, have played a significant role in elevating prison conditions in countries
which lacked a tradition of reform. Because of their advisory nature, however, standards
are inherently different from enforceable rules such as those found in a convention,
constitution, or legislative enactment.

As a result, violating a standard does not

automatically warrant a sanction. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized
as much, holding that a mere breach of the European Prison Rules will not amount to a
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits torture or other forms
of cruelty.334 In other words, while conditions may fall short of the standards required by
the European Prison Rules, this does not necessarily constitute inhuman or degrading
treatment in violation of the European Convention and the demands of Article 3.335 The
334
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supra note 113, at 211.

United States Supreme Court has reached the same result with regard to the Standard
Minimum Rules, observing that they are not a constitutional floor.336
Importantly, not all of the provisions in the Standard Minimum Rules are intended
or required to be on the level of an actionable constitutional right.

Some of the

provisions are plainly aspirational, whereas other have achieved legally binding status
such as the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment. These, however, are also regulated by other multinational conventions, such
as the CAT and the ICCPR, as well as domestic provision such as those found in the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Even as a “soft” source of law, standards are not necessarily less important than
conventional or constitutional rules and judicial decrees. As one commentator has noted
it would be a mistake to underestimate the utility of the European Prison Rules and “the
moral and practical influence they exert,” particularly in light of the increased authority
in the inspection process and the procedural mechanisms created by the Council of
Europe to enhance the rules’ enforceability.337 The European Prison Rules have been
336
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Neale, European Prison Rules: Contextual, Philosophical and Practical Aspects,
supra note 113, at 211. Specifically, to strengthen compliance the Council of
Europe has increased its “procedural machinery” by requiring reports from
member states every five years to be studied by an appointed “Select Committee.”
Id. at 212. The European Committee for Co-operation in Prison Affairs (the
“CCPA”) was formed in 1981, and further serves the purpose of enforcement by
collecting and disseminating information and data, such as through publication of
the Prison Information Bulletins, as well as identifying “specific problems” that
may arise in a particular country. Id. at 213. Co-operative arrangements to
achieve remedies for these problems have further enhanced the status of the
European Prison Rules. See id.

widely accepted and, although not binding in international law, they are held in high
regard in the international community because of the political obligations and moral
sanction imposed on the national authorities who have agreed to be bound by them.338
European countries that have declined to incorporate the European Prison Rules into their
domestic law, most notably the United Kingdom,339 have faced significant problems. In
that respect, the United Kingdom has been plagued with bad reports about its prisons and
outbursts of prison violence.340 Its failure to adopt the rules has resulted in criticism.341
Although many of the standards found in the European Prison Rules exist in the UK
system, in regulations, manuals, operational codes, and the like, “[w]hat is lacking is a
discrete codification and the means of enforcement.”342
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On April 1, 1990, for examples, prisoners at the Strangeways prison began the
“longest and most devastating riot in British penal history.” PRISONS AFTER
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1994). It lasted for twenty-five days, and inspired serious riots at five other
prisons and various forms of disruption at more than thirty other establishments in
England and Wales. Id. The riots resulted in an inquiry with public hearings and
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Even with the wide acceptance enjoyed by the European Prison Rules,
compliance with these standards has been a problem.

In some areas the level of

compliance is reportedly “barely above the minimum,” although shortfalls are in
application of some of the rules are allegedly technical or peripheral in nature.343 Thus,
although Europe has taken great strides in implementing the Standard Minimum Rules,
clearly there is room for improvement.

That improvement is the addition of other

mechanisms, such as inspections or accreditation programs, and the obligations placed on
states and prison administrators by courts with authority to enforce prisoners’ rights.
The prospect for a renewed version of the European Prison Rules and for a Prison
Charter is important because of ongoing political changes in Europe, which continues to
grow as a union. The growing number of new member states from Central and Eastern
Europe is another important factor, as many of these new states (such as Russia) have
high prison populations.344

Many of these new members have also only recently

abolished the death penalty, meaning that these states will have to deal with larger
numbers of prisoners serving life sentences.345
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Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights have underscored the
importance that positive obligations have by requiring member states to take action.346
For example, Russia has been directed to report on steps taken to prevent further human
rights violations following an adverse judgment, which found violations of Article 3 of
the European Convention with respect to overcrowded and unsanitary conditions of pretrial detention.347 As the Court noted, Article 46 of the European Convention obliges
every state to abide by the judgments of the Court, which includes the adoption of general
measures to prevent new violations of the Convention similar to those found in the
Court’s judgments.348 This is an example of the potential part that standards can play in
improving the prison conditions that exist in former totalitarian states, which in the past
may have been resistant to international guidelines like the Standard Minimum Rules as
an unwarranted intrusion into domestic affairs.
The world community has an obvious interest in encouraging states without
adequate prisons or prison standards to adopt the Standard Minimum Rules. This is why
the unenthusiastic record of implementation, as demonstrated by the low level of
responses to United Nations survey efforts, is so troubling. As one United States district
court has recently observed, the record of compliance with the reporting requirements on
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules by United Nations member states

346
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constitutes “both relevant practice and evidence of opinio juris” as customary
international law.349 While the lackluster record of responses to the surveys issued by the
United Nations is disconcerting, it should not detract from the status of the Standard
Minimum Rules as evidence of what is considered good practice.350 The proposed draft
Charter of Fundamental Rights of Prisoners by the United Nations Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2003 is further evidence of the influence of the
Standard Minimum Rules and of which norms are recognized as basic.
In spite of their aspirational character and the lukewarm response to the United
Nations’ surveys, “the Rules are meant to be binding on the conscience of nations.”351
For all of the limitations found in the Geneva Convention regime and its application to
prisoners taken during an armed conflict,352 the Standard Minimum Rules persist as a
“global floor” of minimally acceptable treatment for all persons detained no matter what
the context.353 Therefore, as illustrated by the controversy over the treatment of detainees
at Guantanamo Bay, prison standards should continue to be an important and not an
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impotent tool in establishing minimum levels of treatment for the protection of those
detained under any set of circumstances.

